Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2017

Andrea Yates: A Continuing Story about Insanity
Deborah W. Denno
Fordham University School of Law, ddenno@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Deborah W. Denno, Andrea Yates: A Continuing Story about Insanity 367 (2017)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/974

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Insanity Defense

—-1
—0
—+1

White_2nd pass.indd 1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909041

11/30/16 12:11 PM

The Insanity Defense
Multidisciplinary Views on Its History,
Trends, and Controversies
Mark D. White, Editor

—-1
—0
—+1

White_2nd pass.indd 3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909041

11/30/16 12:11 PM

Copyright © 2017 by Mark D. White
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherw ise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a
review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-P ublication Data
Names: White, Mark D., 1971– editor.
Title: The insanity defense : multidisciplinary views on its history, trends,
and controversies / Mark D. White, editor.
Description: Santa Barbara, California : Praeger, 2017.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016036080 (print) | LCCN 2016036453 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781440831805 (hardback) | ISBN 9781440831812 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Insanity defense—History. | Insanity (Law) | Law—Psychological
aspects. | Criminal intent.
Classification: LCC K5077 .I49 2017 (print) | LCC K5077 (ebook) |
DDC 345/.04—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016036080
ISBN: 978-1-4408-3180-5
EISBN: 978-1-4408-3181-2
21 20 19 18 17   1 2 3 4 5
This book is also available as an eBook.
Praeger
An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC
ABC-CLIO, LLC
130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911
www.abc-clio.com

-1—
0—
+1—

This book is printed on acid-free paper
Manufactured in the United States of America

White_2nd pass.indd 4

11/30/16 12:11 PM

CHAPTER TWELVE

Andrea Yates: A Continuing
Story about Insanity
Deborah W. Denno

In 2001, Andrea Yates did the unthinkable: she drowned her five children
one by one in a bathtub within the course of minutes. Immediately thereafter she called 9-1-1 and then her husband Rusty to confess.1 “No,” she
did not hate her c hildren, she explained to the police. Nor was she angry
at them.2 She had, however, considered killing her children for two years
because she did not want them “tormented by Satan” as she was.3 She
revealed that Satan had been conveying “bad thoughts” to her and she was
concerned he would entice her children into his evil ways. She believed
Satan was “inside [her] giving [her] directions . . . about harming the
children . . . about a way out—to drown them.” If she successfully killed
her c hildren, however, they “would go up to heaven and be with God, be
safe.”4 She also realized that she was not a good mother and “that it was
time to be punished” by the criminal justice system. In Yates’ mind, Satan
had selected her c hildren b
 ecause of Yates’ own personal “weaknesses.”5
Only l ater would her defense uncover a substantial array of evidence showing her long history of postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis,
along with her many cries for help from the m
 ental health system.6
Less than a year a fter the drownings, in 2002, a jury in Harris County,
Texas, convicted Yates of capital murder and sentenced her to life in
prison.7 Although the prosecution had requested the death penalty, Yates
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avoided it b
 ecause the jury did not consider her a “continuing threat to
society.”8 At the same time, the jury did not accept the defense’s argument
that Yates was insane, or that Yates thought she was under Satan’s influence at the time she drowned her c hildren. Rather, they sided with the
prosecution’s account that Yates was sane and acting intentionally when
she killed her children even though the prosecution’s experts also believed
that Yates was often psychotic.9 The most persuasive proponent of this
account was Park Dietz, M.D., the prosecution’s star expert witness.10 He
pushed the view that Yates had rationally planned the murders and had
manipulated postpartum stress and hospitalizations to get Rusty to buy
her a h
 ouse (the family was living in a cramped school bus) and to take a
break from caring for her c hildren.11 Yet the extent of Dietz’s speculation
about Yates was troubling. T
 here was little, if any, empirical basis for his
conclusions, and he clearly lacked expertise in postpartum depression and
postpartum psychosis.12
In 2003 I published an article on the Andrea Yates trial and sentencing
in which I focused on Dietz’s questionable and undocumented testimony,
particularly as it pertained to postpartum illnesses.13 As it would so happen, Yates’ defense attorneys discovered an additional problem with Dietz’s
testimony. After the verdict but before the punishment phase of the trial,
the defense learned that Dietz had introduced false testimony during the
trial. Although the defense moved for a mistrial based on this newly found
information, the trial court denied the motion and allowed the trial to
proceed.14
The error involved Dietz’s testimony during cross-examination in which
Yates’ defense attorney, George Parnham, asked Dietz if he was a consul
tant for the telev ision show, Law & Order.15 Dietz said that he was a con
sultant on two of the Law & Order programs. When the defense asked if
either program concerned “postpartum depression or women’s mental
health,” Dietz responded as follows: “As a m
 atter of fact, t here was a show
of a w
 oman with postpartum depression who drowned her c hildren in the
bathtub and was found insane and it was aired shortly before [Andrea
Yates’] crime occurred.”16 Yet the defense discovered no such show existed.
The producer of Law & Order and his lawyer could not verify such a show
ever aired, and Dietz ultimately admitted “he had made an error.”17 Unaware
of Dietz’s error, the prosecution used Dietz’s incorrect statement in the cross
examination of a defense psychiatrist, who stated, when asked, that she
would have questioned Yates differently had she known of the show.18 The
prosecution also used Dietz’s reference in closing arguments, suggesting
that Yates was not only influenced by the Law & Order episode but that
she also viewed its strategies as a “way out.”19
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Concern over Dietz’s testimony prompted a g rand jury investigation of
 hether he should be charged with perjury.20 In 2003, however, a year a fter
w
Yates’ sentencing, a Harris County grand jury declined to indict Dietz for
perjury after Dietz appeared before them and answered questions about
his testimony.21 Grand jury members accepted Dietz’s explanation that
his Law & Order testimony was an “innocent mistake.”22 Regardless, the
defense appealed Yates’ sentence. In 2005 the Texas Court of Appeals
acknowledged the degree of Dietz’s impact on the jury. Given that Dietz
“was the only m
 ental health expert who testified that [Andrea knew] right
from wrong” and that the prosecution relied on the error during trial, the
Texas Court of Appeals determined that Dietz’s “testimony was critical to
establish the State’s case.”23 There was also “a reasonable likelihood that
Dr. Dietz’s false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury”
and that “the trial court abused its discretion in denying [Andrea’s] motion
for mistrial.”24 As a result, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.25
The second trial of Andrea Yates during the summer of 2006 showed
substantial differences from the first trial, particularly b
 ecause the death
26
penalty was no longer an option. Because the jury in the first trial had
sentenced Yates to life, prosecutors in the second trial could not ask for
death.27 While “[t]he basic thrust” of Dietz’s testimony and that of the key
defense expert, Phillip Resnick, M.D., “was unchanged from the first trial,”28
the jury and the social-legal atmosphere w
 ere different.29 In the first trial,
for example, Yates’ jury was “death qualified.”30 Death qualification means
that the prosecution could exclude potential jurors for cause if they w
 ere
so ambivalent or negative about the death penalty that it would impair their
decision making and ability to apply the law.31 Research shows that death
qualified juries are generally more punitive and more likely to convict than
juries that are not death qualified.32 In Yates’ second trial, however, the jury
was not death qualified and thus presumably more inclined to support an
insanity defense.33
There were other differences between the two trials. After Yates’ 2002
conviction, t here was an enormous amount of publicity accompanying her
case and life circumstances. News articles accentuated the medical and
social underpinnings of postpartum depression and psychosis as well as
the need to better educate the public and m
 ental health professionals about
mental illness and the health care system. The legal and medical community also rallied for more information and training, which resonates to the
 oused in Skyview
present day.34 In addition, by this time, Yates was h
Penitentiary, where the warden provided her the best mental health care
available in his facility. Therefore the defense could more easily present
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Yates as an inmate with mental health issues.35 Fin ally, two other women
in Texas had been found not guilty by reason of insanity for killing their
children between the time of Yates’ first and second t rials. B ecause these
women’s circumstances w
 ere so similar to Yates’, their more lenient
treatment raised further questions about why Yates’ case was treated so
differently.36
The momentum of this publicity and support for Yates bolstered the
defense and most likely influenced the jury in her second trial. After 12
hours of deliberation, the jury unanimously found Yates not guilty by reason of insanity.37 It appeared this second jury could distinguish between
Yates’ true mental state and what seemed to be her planned and rational
conduct on the day that she killed her c hildren.38 As the jury foreman
explained, “ ‘We understand that she knew it was legally wrong. But in her
delusional mind . . . we believed that she thought what she did was right.’ ”39
After the second jury trial, Yates was initially committed to North Texas
State Hospital, Vernon Campus, a high-security mental health facility.40 She
was transferred in 2007 to Kerrville State Hospital, a low-security mental
hospital, where she remains.41 In 2012, Yates applied to the Houston district court to leave the hospital for two hours each week to attend church
serv ices; however, the judge denied her request.42 Similarly, in 2015, Yates
and her doctors requested a judge to allow her to leave Kerrville for supervised group outings with other patients, such as picnics.43 Yet Yates’ doctors revoked the request in light of a rash of negative commentary about
her from the press and the public; they “fear[ed] that any good that would
come from the outings would be outweighed by the crush of criticism over
the decision.”44 For now, Yates comes up for review in the district court
every year u
 ntil the time she may be discharged (if ever).45
The Andrea Yates case produced a mixed impact on the world of law
and medicine. On the one hand, the case helped wake the world to the
reality and pervasiveness of postpartum depression and psychosis.46 After
Yates’ first trial, for example, George Parnham and his wife established the
Yates C
 hildren Memorial Fund. The purpose of the Fund is to provide
guidance to medical professionals on how to detect potential symptoms
of postpartum depression and psychosis in new mothers.47 The Parnhams
were also instrumental in the creation of the Andrea Yates Law. Enacted
in 2003, the law mandates hospitals and medical personnel to notify
patients about postpartum challenges.48
There are other areas of law and medicine, however, where the Yates
case has shown no impact. Most critically, t here have been no substantive
changes in Texas insanity law49 since the time of Yates’ first trial even
though the Texas standard is among the narrowest in the country.50 As
the rest of this chapter explains in more detail, the state’s definition of
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insanity influenced the first trial and both constrained and confused how
the jury could view her actions. For example, both the prosecution and
the defense agreed that Yates was mentally ill and, in general, that she knew
her actions were legally wrong. Yet the issue of whether her mental illness
rendered her unable to control her actions, although hotly debated, was
moot u
 nder the extreme confines of the Texas insanity statute. Therefore,
in both the first and second trials, only one key question was left for the
jury to resolve: Did Yates know that her actions w
 ere morally wrong? The
following pages provide the backdrop for answering that question.*

1 Andrea Yates, the Original Story
In 2003, everyone knew the story about the highly publicized case of
Andrea Yates. Or at least they thought they did. Yates, high school valedictorian, swim team champion, college graduate, and registered nurse married
Russell (“Rusty”) Yates in 1993 after a four-year courtship. Both were 28.
Over the next seven years, Andrea gave birth to five children and suffered
one miscarriage, all the while plunging deeper into mental illness. Then on
June 20, 2001, in less than an hour, Andrea drowned all of her children in
the bathtub, one by one. Months later, she was convicted of capital murder
in Harris County, Texas, where she now serves a life sentence.
Some may think that a mentally ill m
 other who committed such an act
should be judged insane. Yet, news accounts and court records suggest that
Yates impaired her attorneys’ efforts to plead insanity. Such defense plans
were already encumbered by the unusually strict Texas insanity standard
and the state’s renowned retributive culture. After a jury found her competent to stand trial, she resented the efforts that her attorneys mounted
on her behalf even as she faced possible execution. Yates insisted there was
nothing wrong with her mind and that she deserved to die. She seemed to
be awaiting punishment for her sins.
To those closest to Yates, this self-blaming reaction came as no surprise.
They could testify that she had been tormented by bouts of mental illness,
and, in fact, both the prosecution and defense agreed that she was mentally
ill. Yates’ life was also distinguished by religious obsession and a steadfast
devotion to tales of sin and Scripture, a “repent-or-burn zeal” that led her to
believe she was a bad mother with ruined offspring. According to Yates, she
killed her c hildren to save them from Satan and her own evil maternal

*What follows is adapted from Denno, “Who is Andrea Yates?” (The footnotes and appendices have
been removed to enhance narrative flow; the interested reader is referred to the original article for
t hose details.)
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influences, delusions that did little to help her defense because they fueled
her own desire for punishment.
Public opinion on the Yates killings helps explain some of the more contradictory themes in the case. On the one hand, the public had much
sympathy for Yates and the life that she led. Yet, her composed behavior
on the day she killed her children stirred a strong retributive response.
Many w
 ere unable to comprehend such violence except by declaring it
intentional and evil. According to this view, it could be said that Yates was
supremely sane—her acts rational and premeditated—despite her unquestioned history of postpartum psychosis. She propelled this account, spurring the public, her “jury,” to see her as the Satanic m
 other she believed
herself to be.
These complex and conflicting aspects of the Yates case fed into the
prosecution’s depiction of her m
 ental state on the day she killed her
children. But, one psychiatrist’s testimony seemed to have a greater impact
than the others on the case’s outcome. The prosecution’s star expert, Park
Dietz, appeared particularly a dept at persuading the jury to accept the
prosecution’s assertion that Yates was sane and acting intentionally when
she killed her children. Because the Yates case is on appeal, many of the
court records are not available. In addition, the defense team still lacks
funds to pay for the entire trial transcript so it too cannot be examined.
Dietz’s testimony, however, is now accessible and it warrants a thorough
analysis in its own right.
What is most striking about Dietz’s testimony is how his opinions about
Yates’ m
 ental state could carry so much authority with the jury. Criminal
trials commonly involve different sides presenting competing legal “stories” about their version of the facts. The law’s role is to ensure that just
verdicts result from t hese conflicting representations. Courts must be perceived “as fair and disinterested, capable of rising above the self-serving
and adversarial narratives by which cases are presented.” While the law
provides evidentiary standards and procedures to oversee what information is released in court and how, an immense amount of discretion exists
nonetheless in the ways stories can be told. It remains unclear who is to
police these narratives—beyond the structures already in place—or
whether such oversight is even needed.
In the Yates case, the defense claimed that her m
 ental illness caused her
to believe that killing her children was the right course of action. Although
Yates’ attorneys called a number of experts to prove their argument, each
expert had a different twist on this central viewpoint. Therefore, the
defense’s story about Yates, while emphasizing her insanity, was still somewhat muddled. In contrast, the prosecution’s story about Yates’ sanity was
clearer and also apparently consistent with the cultural norms of Harris
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County, Texas. The prosecution argued that Yates may have been gripped
by her belief in some demonic command, but she was still fully capable of
knowing she was doing something wrong. And Yates seemed to concur,
damningly perhaps. Her story was congruent with the prosecution’s. She
had sinned and deserved punishment for acting out the devil’s dictates.
In all likelihood, however, Yates’ own story was indicative of her m
 ental
illness, not evidence of the disposition she felt she most deserved. Nonetheless, both her narrative and that of the prosecution were accentuated
by courtroom storyteller, Park Dietz.
This chapter analyzes the problematic aspects of Dietz’s testimony in
an effort to contribute some balance to the Andrea Yates story. While Dietz’s
comments may have confirmed the Harris County jury’s preconceptions,
they were virtually unsubstantiated. Dietz also has no significant expertise in postpartum depression or psychosis even though both sides agreed
that Yates severely suffered from the disorders and that they significantly
affected her conduct.
Of course, expert witnesses are routinely used in litigation. Dietz is simply one of the more prominent and prolific examples of what the criminal
justice system seeks. Despite the long history of expert witnesses in criminal trials, the justice system should question the fairness and efficacy of
such an unregulated storytelling process. The potential for inequity is all
the more pronounced in a case where the prosecution’s story lacks factual
justification, both sides agree the defendant is mentally ill, and the death
penalty is at stake.
Section 2 of the rest of this chapter briefly discusses Yates’ life up to her
marriage to Rusty as well as the outcome of her trial. Section 3 provides
an overview of the insanity defense and the strict Texas insanity standard.
Section 4 examines Dietz’s background, his reputation, and his psychiatric philosophy, in addition to his proclivity to testify for the prosecution.
Section 5 describes Yates’ history of mental illness, especially her postpartum psychosis that started with the birth of her first child and ended with
a severe psychotic episode. Section 6 focuses on Dietz’s testimony in the
Yates trial, beginning with his pre-trial interview with Yates and ending
with an analysis of his conclusions. The discussion emphasizes the speculative nature of many of Dietz’s statements and their lack of connection
to Yates’ history of mental illness. Section 7 presents the other perspectives
and experts in the Yates case, and considers how the case might have
reached a different result with a more consistent defense strategy or a less
rigid insanity standard.
The Andrea Yates case is a vast, book-length narrative. This commentary covers just a part of the trial. It is beyond this chapter’s scope, for
example, to scrutinize the general role of psychiatric experts in the criminal
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justice system or to review the research on postpartum depression and
postpartum psychosis, which is available elsewhere. Nonetheless, examining one piece of the Yates story can be enlightening. “Narrative, we are
finally coming to realize, is indeed serious business—whether in law, in
literature, or in life.”

2 The Early Life and Trial of Andrea Yates
2.1 Meet the Yates Family

-1—
0—
+1—

Andrea Yates was raised in the Houston area. Her family background
appeared to be middle-American and m
 iddle class. Her f ather was a retired
auto shop teacher who died of Alzheimer’s disease shortly before the killings. Her mother, Jutta Karin, was a homemaker. Yates, the youngest of
five, was expected to be a high achiever and, in high school, she succeeded:
she was captain of the swim team, a National Honor Society member, and
valedictorian of her 1982 graduating class. Upon completing a two-year
pre-nursing program at the University of Houston, she went on to the University of Texas School of Nursing in Houston, graduating in 1986. From
1986 to 1994, she was employed as a registered nurse at the University of
Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center. Andrea’s nursing c areer ceased
entirely, however, soon a fter her marriage to Rusty.
Andrea and Rusty first met in 1989 at the Houston apartment complex
where they both resided. Both w
 ere 25 at the time. Rusty, “a popular jock”
in high school and a summa cum laude graduate of Auburn University,
was designing computer systems for NASA. Andrea approached him first
in conversation—an uncharacteristically bold move for her, Rusty would
later reveal. Only a fter Andrea’s arrest would Rusty learn that she had never
dated u
 ntil she had turned 23, that she was recuperating from a romantic
break-up at the time they met, and that her directness in initiating contact
with him was prompted by intense loneliness and, perhaps, depression.
Andrea and Rusty spent the next few years becoming acquainted, “living
together, reading the Bible, and praying.”
Their April 17, 1993, wedding ceremony was small and s imple. Surprisingly, it was also nondenominational, perhaps because of the influence of
Rusty’s spiritual mentor, Michael Woroniecki, from whom “he had learned
the faults of organized religion.” The couple confidently announced to wedding guests that they would not use birth control—they wanted as many
children as nature would provide. Their desire for children was immediately fulfilled. Within three months, Andrea was pregnant with the first
of five children. Eight years later she would kill them all.
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2.2 The Yates Trial
On July 30, 2001, Yates was indicted on two counts of capital murder
for the deaths of Noah (seven), John (five), and Mary (six months), but not
for the deaths of her other two children, Luke (three) and Paul (two). All
of the indictments w
 ere for capital murder b
 ecause they involved more than
one person and victims less than six years old. On the same day, Yates’
attorneys, George Parnham and Wendell Odom, filed a “notice of intent
to offer evidence of the insanity defense,” based upon the testimony of two
psychiatrists claiming that Yates was, at the time of the killings, “mentally
insane” as defined by the Texas Penal Code.
The insanity defense for Yates would ultimately dissolve. Within eight
months following her indictment, one jury decided that Yates was sufficiently competent to stand trial for killing her c hildren and another refused
her insanity plea. Although this second jury declined to impose the death
penalty, Yates received a mandatory life sentence for the killings. Under
the Texas capital felony statute, an inmate must serve forty years in prison
before becoming eligible for parole. The case is currently on appeal.
Many theories could explain Yates’ conviction. Of course, the primary
theory would speculate that the jury was so horrified by her acts that any
psychiatric evidence offered on her behalf paled in comparison. Yet, the
continuing controversy and debate over Yates’ conviction suggest that there
may be other, more complex, explanations.
Additional rationales primarily point to the retributive aspects of Texas
law and culture. As one Harris County resident explained, “There’s the rule
of law, and there’s the rule of law in Texas. . . . The rule of law in Texas is
kind of cowboy law.” For example, Texas consistently executes more individuals than any other state; annually it accounts for one-third of all executions in the country, a pattern that conflicts with both national and
international abolitionist trends. Harris County in particular is responsible for over one-third of the state’s death row inmates, making it the harshest death penalty jurisdiction in the country and one of the most punitive
in the Western world. If Harris County w
 ere considered a state, it would
follow only two other states (Texas and V
 irginia) in its number of executions since 1977.
Because the Yates prosecution sought the death penalty, the jury was
“death qualified.” In other words, the prosecution could exclude potential
jurors for cause if their negative views toward the death penalty w
 ere so
strong they “would ‘prevent or substantially impair the perform ance of
[their] duties as [jurors]’ ” and therefore render them “unable to faithfully
and impartially apply the law.” Research shows that death qualified juries
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are more anti-civil libertarian in attitude, particularly with respect to such
principles as presumption of innocence and burden of proof, and they are
significantly more likely to convict than juries that are not death qualified. Presumably, then, Yates’ jury was far less able to “comprehend the
inconceivable” in evaluating an insanity defense relative to a jury that had
not been death qualified.
The Texas insanity standard is a comparably strict rule of law; in the eyes
of one legal commentator, it is “one of the most stringent” in the United
States. The Yates jury judged psychiatric testimony not only by Texas culture
but also by that culture’s narrow legal view of what constitutes insanity.

3 The Insanity Defense
3.1 A Brief Overview of the Insanity Defense
This section explores only the very basics of the insanity defense and
how it is applied in the state of Texas. The insanity defense is considered
one of the most controversial criminal law doctrines, not only b
 ecause of
intense debate over how “insanity” should be defined, but also b
 ecause of
increasing conflict over whether the defense should exist in any form. Statistics show that insanity pleas are seldom raised or successful in states
throughout the country, including Texas. Nonetheless, the defense rankles
social and community tensions over two conflicting goals: the desire to
punish the horrendous, highly publicized crimes that the public typically
hears about versus the need to understand that some mentally ill p
 eople
should not be held responsible for what they do.
3.1.1 The Major Legal Standards for Insanity

-1—
0—
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The legal standard for insanity varies across the 50 states. The first and
strictest insanity test of modern usage was introduced in 1843 by the
English House of Lords in the M’Naghten case. U
 nder M’Naghten, a person is insane if, b
 ecause of a “disease of the mind” at the time she committed the act, she (1) did not know the “nature and quality of the act” that
she was performing; or (2) if she was aware of the act, she did not know
that what she “was doing was wrong,” that is, she did not know the difference between right and wrong. The M’Naghten Rule, which soon became
the most widely accepted insanity test in the United States, considers only
cognitive ability and not volitional conduct.
Concern over the narrowness of the M’Naghten test prompted attempts
over the years to replace it. The most successful attempt was the American
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Law Institute (ALI)’s 1962 insanity test, which rapidly gained support from
legislatures and courts; by the 1980s, the ALI standard was a dopted nearly
unanimously by the federal circuit courts and over one-half of the states.
Under the ALI test, an individual is not responsible for her criminal conduct if, b
 ecause of m
 ental disease or defect, she e ither lacked “substantial
capacity” to appreciate the “criminality” (or, at the opting of the state legislature, the “wrongfulness”) of her conduct, or she failed to “conform” her
conduct “to the requirements of law.”
The differences between the ALI and M’Naghten tests are striking. For
example, the ALI test accepts both cognitive and volitional impairment as
an excuse. In other words, the test considers a defendant’s cognitive ability to “appreciate” the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct as well
as her ability to “conform” her conduct to the law. This added “conform”
requirement is often characterized as a “lack-of-control defense,” pertaining to those individuals whose mental disease or defect leads them to lose
control over their actions at the time they commit an offense.
The ALI and M’Naghten standards vary in other important ways. The
ALI test requires only that defendants “lack substantial capacity,” not total
capacity. In turn, the ALI applies the broader term “appreciate” rather than
“know” when specifying the type of cognitive impairment that leads to
insanity; hence, the defendant’s lack of emotional understanding can be
incorporated into the defense. The ALI test also allows the state legislature to consider “wrongfulness” rather than “criminality.” This choice
enables a finding of insanity if the accused does not know the act was illegal and also if she believes the act was “morally justified” according to
community standards. At the same time, both the ALI and M’Naghten tests
skirt any set definition of the term “mental disease or defect.” According
to the ALI, such an open-ended approach allows the term “to accommodate developing medical understanding” and therefore avoid the constraints
of old science.
The popularity of the ALI test dwindled in 1981 when a jury found John
Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity, based on an ALI standard, for
his attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan. The effects of the public
furor over Hinckley’s acquittal were immediate: the federal government and
several of the ALI test states abolished the volitional component of the test
entirely and imposed other limits, in some cases reverting back to a
M’Naghten-type standard. According to a 1995 survey of insanity laws,
about twenty states still use the ALI test while nearly half of the states apply
“some variation of the M’Naghten/cognitive impairment-only test.” A handful of states have abolished the insanity defense entirely.
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3.1.2 Modern Problems with the M’Naghten Insanity Standard
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The return to a M’Naghten-type standard spotlights the problems that
the test has always had and why there have been continuing efforts to
change it. For example, the word “know” and the phrase “nature and quality of the act” can be defined e ither very broadly or narrowly. Such vagueness gives legal actors l ittle guidance for interpreting the test and heightens
the chance that they will apply it inconsistently across different cases. Likewise, it is not clear w
 hether the “wrong” in the right-and-w rong prong
pertains to legal or moral wrongdoing because the language in M’Naghten
itself could bolster either approach. England has since established that the
right-and-w rong element represents the defendant’s recognition that an
act is legally wrong. Yet, American law sides in the opposite direction.
Most American courts have interpreted the word “wrong” to mean “moral
wrong,” not “legal wrong.” This issue was important in the Yates case because
Texas law does not specify a particular approach and a moral wrong
approach would have benefited her. According to some defense experts,
Yates knew that her acts were illegal but she believed they were morally
right, given the context of her delusional circumstances.
In American states that apply the moral right-and-wrong test, questions
typically concern whether the defendant knowingly transgressed society’s
standards of morality, not whether the defendant personally perceived
her acts to be morally acceptable. In other words, even if a defendant is
mentally ill and, as a result, commits an offense that she believes is morally correct, she is considered sane if she is aware that her conduct is
condemned by society. As one commentator notes, however, this difference can “be blurred to near extinction” depending on how the particular
circumstances in a case are pitched. For example, a mentally ill individual
“is apt to know that society considers it morally wrong to kill, but if she is
acting pursuant to a delusionary belief that God wants her to kill, she might
now believe that society would agree with her God-endorsed actions.”
Interpretation of the moral-r ight-and-w rong standard can vary somewhat in the few M’Naghten jurisdictions that have a “deific decree doctrine,” in other words, a rule that allows a mentally disordered defendant
to be judged legally insane if she believes that she is acting under the direct
command of God (for example, a belief that God commanded the defendant to kill someone). Two primary rationales explain the origins of the
deific decree doctrine. First, the doctrine “was merely a logical extension
of the Judeo-Christian belief that God would not order a person to kill
another” because the Sixth Commandment prohibits murder. Therefore, a
person thinking that God is commanding her to kill is entertaining a false
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belief and thus should not be held accountable. Likewise, 19th-century
courts and juries would not grant the insanity defense to individuals contending that they acted under the command of the Devil or some other
religiously corrupt figure because people accepted only “the One True
God.” Second, the doctrine may have been a vehicle for inserting a volitional
component exception to the cognitive-only limitations of the M’Naghten
Rule so that M’Naghten could incorporate at least a narrow category of
uncontrolled individuals.
The exceptions and qualifications for the deific decree doctrine apparently still apply today for defendants experiencing such “command hallucinations.” The doctrine presumes that the defendant’s behavior results
from a delusion (a “false belief based on incorrect inference about external
reality”), and not from a religious conviction, although determining the difference between the two can be very difficult. While some jurisdictions
treat the deific decree rule as an exception to the general insanity standard, other jurisdictions view it as a major factor in assessing an individual’s capability to tell right from wrong. Irrespective of a jurisdiction’s
particular approach, t hese right-wrong issues were key in the Andrea Yates
case. Yates’ command hallucinations were a focus of the expert testimony
and what was supposed to be considered “wrong” was neither specified,
nor constrained, in the jury charge.

3.2 The Texas Insanity Standard
In 1973, Texas joined the ranks of other states and a dopted the more
lenient ALI definition of insanity. A decade l ater, however, the state returned
to a M’Naghten-type standard, partly in response to developments surrounding the Hinckley verdict. Yet, a critical feature of the Texas test is
that it is even narrower than M’Naghten, although comparably confusing.
The typical M’Naghten standard refers to two parts: the defendant’s ability to know (1) the “nature and quality of the act committed” or (2) w
 hether
the act was “right or wrong.” The Texas standard, however, eliminates the
first part and refers only to the second, that is, w
 hether the defendant knew
the act was right or wrong. Texas also limits the defense to cases of severe
mental illness and puts the burden of proving insanity on defendants. As
legal commentators rightly contend, the Texas standard “could hardly be
narrower” or more “impossible to meet.”
Similar to the M’Naghten standard, defining the terms “right” and
“wrong” is a problem. For example, the Texas insanity statute does not clarify whether “wrong” should be considered from a legal or a moral standpoint.
This ambiguity was a key issue in the Yates case, both for the law and the
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psychiatric profession. As one psychiatric expert commenting on the case
said, there is still no “test” available to determine who is genuinely controlled by command hallucinations; rather, psychiatrists must rely on “a
certain degree of approximation” in their assessments. Likewise, the Yates
jury charge did not specify what “wrong” should mean and expert testimony did not seem to restrict the definition of “wrongfulness.” The Yates
jury was free to use the term’s “common and ordinary meaning” and apply
“the statutory language to the facts as it saw fit.”
Such a legally muddled circumstance prompted conflicting approaches
to interpreting the Texas insanity standard. As the Yates case evolved, for
example, it became clear that both the prosecution and the defense would
define the legal-or-moral wrong issue b
 ecause of the statute’s silence. Both
sides agreed that Yates was mentally ill and, in general, that she knew her
actions w
 ere legally wrong. The issue of whether Yates’ mental illness rendered her unable to control her actions, although hotly debated, was moot
under the narrow confines of the Texas insanity statute. Thus, only one
significant question was left for the jury to resolve: Did Yates know that
her actions w
 ere morally wrong?

4 Park Dietz’s Expertise and Psychiatric Philosophy
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 here was little legal or psychiatric clarity guiding the determinations
T
to be made in the Yates case. For this reason, the opinions of expert witnesses were especially important. According to a synopsis of the ethical
guidelines established by the American Academy of Psychiatry and the
Law, “the medical expert is expected to provide a clinical evaluation and
a review of the applicable data in light of the legal question posed and in
the spirit of honesty and striving for objectivity—the expert’s ethical and
professional obligation.” The Academy specifies that such an obligation
“includes a thorough, fair, and impartial review and should not exclude
any relevant information in order to create a view favoring e ither the plaintiff or the defendant.”
According to some legal commentators, Park Dietz’s expert testimony
was considered “crucial” for the conviction of Andrea Yates—the “defining moment” of the trial. Section 4 examines Dietz’s background, experience, and psychiatric philosophy in an effort to explain why Dietz’s story
about Yates seemed so much more compelling than the other stories experts
had to offer. Notably, much of the information about Dietz derives from
interviews with Dietz himself, or from his supporters, in magazines and
newspapers. Dietz is commendably forthright about his views in general
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and was immediately open to commenting on the Yates case as soon as
she was sentenced. What becomes apparent is how his own self-described,
pro-prosecution leanings could mesh so well with a death-qualified Harris County jury.

4.1 Dietz’s Background and Reputation
Park Dietz is considered one of the most “prominent and provocative”
psychiatric expert witnesses in the country. In one professional capacity
or another, he has been involved with a long list of famous homicide defendants: John Hinckley, Jr., Jeffrey Dahmer, Susan Smith, Melissa Drexler,
the Menendez b
 rothers, O.J. Simpson (in the civil case), and Ted Kaczynski, to name a few. He can now add Andrea Yates to that list. As the prosecution’s star witness in the Yates case, he both interviewed and videotaped
her, and he subsequently testified in court about his evaluation.
Dietz also has extensive professional credentials. He acquired a BA from
Cornell University in biology and psychology, an MD from Johns Hopkins
School of Medicine, and a Masters in Public Health and PhD in sociology,
both from Johns Hopkins. He has held academic posts at Johns Hopkins,
the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, and the University of Virginia.
His professional experience is substantial, including consulting positions
with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In
addition, Dietz has over one hundred publications, “nearly all” of which
concern violent or injurious behavior, and he has examined “thousands”
of criminal defendants for forensic psychiatric purposes, including sanity
determinations.
Currently (and at the time he testified in the Yates trial), Dietz runs two
businesses in Newport Beach, California. He is the president and founder
of Park Dietz & Associates, Inc., forensic consultants in medicine and the
behavioral sciences, as well as president and founder of Threat Assessment Group, Inc. (TAG), which specializes in the prevention of workplace
violence. Before arriving in Houston to testify in the Yates case, Dietz
mailed his business brochure (describing his companies and the types of
cases on which they work) to a wide range of members of Houston’s legal
community—
prosecutors, defense attorneys, attorneys specializing in
premises liability for violent crime, and lawyers representing elder abuse
victims. Although the Yates defense brought forth evidence of Dietz’s brochure distribution during cross-examination in an effort to portray Dietz
as a “professional testifier,” Dietz did not seem apologetic. Nor did such a
revelation appear to dent the perceived validity of his testimony.
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4.1.1 A Desire to Emphasize “Facts”
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Media articles about Dietz claim he is known for emphasizing “facts”
rather than “theoretical conjecture” when evaluating a case. Indeed, both
Dr. Jonas Rappeport, a renowned professor of Dietz’s at Johns Hopkins
Medical School, as well as Roger Adelman, one of the prosecutors in the
Hinckley case, credit Dietz’s precision and “focus on the facts” as major
contributions Dietz has brought to modernizing the field of forensic
psychiatry.
In line with this facts-driven orientation, Dietz seems to be more concerned with the physical evidence linked to a crime than with the defendant’s history that can be acquired in an interview. According to Dietz, for
example, interviews with defendants have typically “been the linchpin of
forensic assessments”; yet, there are “serious risks” associated with them
because the “natural h
 uman techniques for gaining information from an
interview unthinkingly cut corners by suggesting answers or guessing at
the answer or offering multiple choices.” Such leading or suggestive procedures are comparable to crime scene evidence that has been contaminated or corrupted. Dietz favors instead the second source of mental
evidence, which includes examining the crime scene, analyzing autopsies
and weapons, and interviewing witnesses to the crime. Although “the
ideal” would be to have both types of evidence when making an evaluation, Dietz has stated that, “If I had to choose between the interview [with
the defendant] only or everything except the interview as a means of getting to the truth, I’d prefer everything except the interview because it would
get me to the truth more often.”
Dietz’s apparent stress on facts, combined with what even Rappeport
views as a “rigid” approach towards defendants, has prompted criticism.
According to an article about Dietz in Johns Hopkins Magazine, “some forensic psychiatrists” have accused him of presenting “mere informed opinion
as solid fact, and [complain] that his standard of criminal responsibility is
harsh and unforgiving of mentally ill defendants.” For example, during his
testimony in the Yates case, Dietz indicated that b
 ecause Yates claimed that
Satan, rather than God, told her to kill her children, she knew her actions
were wrong. Yates also failed to act in a way a loving m
 other would if she
really thought she was saving her children from hell by killing them. As
Dietz stated, “I would expect her to comfort the children, telling them they
are g oing to be with Jesus or be with God, but she does not offer words of
comfort to the children.” However, there appears to be no empirical support for this kind of interpretation of the deific decree doctrine, if in fact
that is what Dietz was referencing. Rather, if Dietz’s explanation has any
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source at all, it seems to derive from the centuries-old, Judeo-Christian
origins of the doctrine itself. As one legal critic asked in response to Dietz’s
comments, “Is one to infer that it is somehow more loving to invoke the
name of Jesus while you drown your children than to drown them without any religious commentary?” In other words, Dietz appears to be stressing religion, not facts, a focus more aligned with Southern Bible b
 elt
culture rather than with a medical assessment of Yates’ m
 ental state.
Even Dietz’s supporters have admitted that his inflexible approach may
prevent him from being able (or willing) to comprehend “some of the psychological nuances of h
 uman behavior.” According to Rappeport, a strong
advocate, Dietz has the capability to understand and apply knowledge of
human behavior, he simply chooses not to. As Rappeport explained, “I have
a suspicion he may not like to do that. So he may find himself more frequently on the side of the prosecutor, who d
 oesn’t like to do t hose things
either.” Such an omission is a troubling handicap in a field where “50 percent
or more of medicine is emotional.” It is particularly problematic given that
the cases that typically involve Dietz’s testimony often turn on the very
“nuances” that Dietz discounts.
Indeed, in media interviews and his testimony in the Yates case, Dietz
has made clear that he does not treat patients in a psychiatry practice. This
lack of engagement with patients is “rare” among medical expert witnesses.
Rather, Dietz opts to concentrate on research and one-time interviews with
criminal defendants. Yet, such a view of the psychiatric world is distorted.
For example, it is difficult to comprehend how Dietz can evaluate an individual’s normality or abnormality if he only engages in short-term interviews with highly abnormal people. By encountering briefly only the most
extreme criminal cases, all Dietz sees is pathology. He has no “control
group” as a comparison, no in-depth evaluations of individuals from whom
he can learn nuances. Such an approach may explain additional criticisms
concerning where Dietz draws the line for distinguishing sanity from
insanity. According to Fred S. Berlin, associate professor of psychiatry at
Johns Hopkins and one of the defense’s psychiatric experts in the Jeffrey
Dahmer case, Dietz’s line is too stringent. “He has a high threshold for
evidence that tends to suggest impairment. A narrow range for what he
defines as psychiatric disorder.”
Consistent with this view, in the Yates case Dietz minimized the defense
expert witnesses’ testimony that Yates had suffered years of delusions, auditory hallucinations, and visions of violence. Instead, Dietz claimed that she
had, at most, experienced “obsessional intrusive thoughts.” Yet, contrary
to other high-profile defendants pleading insanity, Yates had a substantial
and documented history of m
 ental illness before she killed her c hildren.
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Not only had she twice attempted suicide, she had also been hospitalized
and prescribed anti-psychotic drugs a fter the birth of her fourth and fifth
children. The defense could call experts who had actually treated Yates,
some repeatedly, in sharp contrast to Dietz’s relatively brief interview. As one
scholar on expert testimony emphasizes, “the legal system assumes that
the treating doctor is more credible than a nontreating doctor”; therefore,
the treating physician “is frequently sought to provide expert testimony.”
Nonetheless, Dietz’s effectiveness as a witness appears to be due to his
alleged emphasis on fact. Because jurors received conflicting expert testimony during the Yates trial, minimal statutory guidance, and unclear stories from both the prosecution and defense, they w
 ere left with little to
rely on other than the supposed “facts.” Compounding this dilemma, the
multiple defense psychiatrists gave somewhat contradictory analyses of
Yates’ mental state, presumably in part because she had been treated or
assessed by a number of them during different stages of her illness. Such
a multiple-theory defense narrative contrasted with the more uniform “factual” narrative presented by Dietz. Given a choice, Dietz’s story may have
been the preferred alternative; the jury could base a decision on something
tangible—“facts”—rather than confusion.
4.1.2 A Prosecutorial Bent
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Almost immediately, Dietz’s testimony and post-trial commentary about
the Yates case sparked notoriety for the views he expressed both inside
and outside the courtroom. In an interview with the New York Times six
weeks a fter his trial testimony, Dietz stressed that his involvement in
the Yates case was “troubling,” both “professionally and personally.” As
he explained, “it was obvious where public opinion lay, it was obvious she
was mentally ill, it was obvious where professional organizations would
like the case to go.” Therefore, while “it would have been the easier course of
action to distort the law a little, ignore the evidence a little, and pretend she
didn’t know what she did was wrong,” it also would have been “wrong . . . 
to stretch the truth and try to engineer the outcome” in that way.
Dietz also tried to justify his career-long tendency to appear primarily
for the prosecution. According to Dietz, prosecutors, like good forensic psychiatrists, strive “to seek truth and justice” and therefore to make available all the information important in a case. In contrast, defense attorneys
attempt to help their clients—a goal that conflicts with a thorough search
for data. “Often there are pieces of evidence that are not in their client’s
interest to have disclosed or produced.” Of course, Dietz’s statements imply
that defense attorneys and their witnesses want to distort information in
some way and shield the truth.
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The irony of Dietz’s points, however, were spotlighted a week later by
Yates’ attorneys. They discovered a factual error that Dietz had made during cross-examination. As the next section discusses, their research showed
that Dietz had testified incorrectly about the existence of a telev ision episode about postpartum depression that never aired.
4.1.3 A Mistake in Testimony
Dietz is a technical advisor to two telev ision shows: Law & Order and
Law & Order: Criminal Intent. In his advisory capacity, he has viewed nearly
300 episodes of both shows. During the Yates trial, Dietz mistakenly testified that, shortly before Yates killed her c hildren, Law & Order aired an
episode involving a postpartum depressed mother who successfully won
an insanity appeal a fter drowning her children in a bathtub. The episode
never existed. When Dietz learned of his error, he wrote prosecutors Joe
Owmby and Kaylynn Williford and informed them that he had confused
the insanity episode he testified about with other Law & Order episodes
and infanticide cases. Dietz’s mistake about such a fact, however, may be
part of the grounds for Yates’ appeal. It is not a stretch to think the jury
may have been affected by Dietz’s implication that Yates was somehow
influenced by the show.
Dietz’s statements about the “truth seeking” differences between the
prosecution and the defense w
 ere also problematic in other ways totally
beyond his control and, presumably, his awareness. For example, trial testimony revealed that the defense was not able to acquire copies of partic
ular documents, including Andrea’s police offense report. George Parnham,
Andrea’s attorney, was allowed only to read her police report but not to
photocopy it. Therefore, Parnham resorted to taking notes on the report,
based only on what he could remember of it. As one defense expert later
revealed, having only Parnham’s notes on Yates’ report put the expert “at
a real disadvantage.”
Dietz also claimed that the defense experts asked “shocking examples
of leading questions” of Yates and provided only partial, and biased, videotapes of their interviews with her. Predictably, his accusation prompted
a response. According to Lucy Puryear, a Houston psychiatrist who testified for Yates’ defense, Dietz did the same. Puryear added that Dietz edited
his eight hours of videotaped interviews with Yates and only “showed the
jury portions that supported his testimony.”
Such media debates simply seem to accentuate the general problems
associated with incorporating psychiatric testimony in an adversarial pro
cess, as well as the weaknesses of the profession itself. Legal commentators emphasized the extent to which both sides in the Yates case differed
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in their conclusions about her m
 ental state given that they w
 ere purportedly examining the same evidence. As the following sections suggest, however, the backgrounds of the experts appeared to have an impact on what
kind of evidence they believed was most significant and why.

4.2 Dietz’s Limitations in Expertise and Investigation
This section examines the extent of Park Dietz’s background and experience for testifying in a case involving a defendant with an undisputed
history of postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis. As one
scholar on expert witnesses has emphasized, “medical professionals who
undertake the role of expert witnesses are generally expected . . . to be
knowledgeable and experienced in the area in which they are functioning
as a medical expert.”
4.2.1 Postpartum Depression and Postpartum Psychosis
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The Yates trial revealed the degree to which Dietz was unfamiliar with
patients diagnosed with postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis
and his admitted void in treating patients. This observation is not meant
to elevate the psychiatric classification of postpartum disorders to a level
of scientific precision and sophistication that it does not deserve. Rather,
this section makes clear that there is still much to be learned about postpartum disorders and how much they can justifiably mitigate criminal
culpability, if at all. At the same time, what is known medically about
the disorders—especially their neurobiological aspects—should not be
ignored. Two postpartum experts highlighted the problem of such informational inadequacy specifically with respect to the prosecution’s approach
in the Yates case: “The real challenge for psychiatry is to educate the legal
profession and juries about the physiological underpinnings of postpartum disorders and other psychoses . . . and, ultimately, to encourage verdicts based on facts.”
Of course, Park Dietz was not responsible for such a lack of education.
It is not the role of the expert witness to provide answers to questions that
are never asked or to draw conclusions without a foundation. Yates’ defense
attorneys could have more aggressively revealed Dietz’s gaps and confronted him with the history of Yates’ illnesses that Dietz bypassed in his
evaluations. Nonetheless, without a fuller expertise on postpartum issues,
Dietz’s story about Yates offered a much simpler mental landscape—and a
greater level of speculation—than may have been warranted given her
background.
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Direct and cross examinations in the Yates trial made clear that Dietz
has been asked to consult on an “unusually high proportion” of cases concerning mothers who kill their children. Yet, according to his testimony,
the last time he had treated a female patient with postpartum depression
was 25 years ago (in 1977). Nor was Dietz “sure” that he ever treated a
patient for postpartum depression with “psychotic features.” Dietz conceded that he stopped treating patients totally “many, many years ago,” in
“1981 or 1982” and that he has no expertise in w
 omen’s m
 ental health.
Dietz’s error concerning the showing of a Law & Order episode on postpartum depression came about when Parnham was cross-examining him
to assess two issues: the sources of Dietz’s income, but also w
 hether Dietz
had any more expertise in postpartum disorders, even at the level of consulting for telev ision shows, than what he indicated in his testimony on
direct examination. It appears Dietz did not have more background because
he did not offer any information other than his consultancy on a nonex
istent episode. Such inexperience does not comport with accepted diagnostic principles of psychiatry.
Dietz’s lack of expertise in postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis is striking given the psychiatric community’s recognition of postpartum disorders and the acceptance by both sides that Yates was afflicted
with one. At the time that Dietz testified, the disorders w
 ere included in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of M
 ental Disorders (DSM), published
by the American Psychiatric Association, then in its fourth (text revised)
edition (DSM-IV-TR). (The fifth edition of the DSM was not published u
 ntil
2013 and therefore was not in existence at the time.) As courts and professionals have noted, “the DSM is often referred to as ‘the psychiatric profession’s diagnostic Bible.’ ” DSM-IV-TR also clearly recognized the link
between postpartum-related mental disorder and infanticide in the context of delusions. Notably, however, postpartum psychosis was not presently treated as an individual diagnostic classification in the DSM-IV-TR.
Rather, the symptoms are categorized according to the established criteria
used to diagnose psychosis (for example, major depressive, manic, or mixed
episode). The “postpartum onset specifier” applied if symptoms occur
within four weeks a fter childbirth.
4.2.2 Yates’ Postpartum Risk Factors and Life Stressors
It appears that Dietz never r eally adequately investigated or acknowledged Yates’ postpartum risk factors—most particularly in the context of
the postpartum period’s “unique . . . degree of neuroendocrine alterations
and psychosocial adjustments,” which the DSM emphasizes. In other
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words, the medical literature stresses that the risk factors for postpartum
disorders cover a broad scope of biological, psychological, and social influences. These factors include an individual’s personal and family history of
depression, biochemical imbalances, recent stressful events, marital conflict, and perceived lack of support from the partner, family, or friends.
Yates experienced all of the postpartum risk factors that the DSM mentions. She was also subject to a host of family and environmental life stressors shown to be linked to postpartum depression and postpartum
psychosis. Dietz only occasionally alluded to these stressors if he mentioned them at all in his testimony. Even if it could be argued that the
direct and cross examinations of Dietz did not prompt further references
to Yates’ disorders, it would be expected that they would be part of Dietz’s
evaluation of her, independent of his courtroom testimony.
Yates’ stressors w
 ere numerous. First, over the course of her marriage
to Rusty (during which she was nearly always e ither pregnant or breastfeeding), Yates consistently demonstrated DSM-listed criteria for postpartum mood disorder: “fluctuations in mood, mood lability, and preoccupation
with infant well-being.” Like the DSM specification, these feelings “ranged
from overconcern to frank delusions” and they also took the form of suicide attempts related to the other circumstances in Yates’ life—uprooted
living conditions and transiency, home schooling her five children, her
father’s death, depressive illnesses throughout her family, Rusty’s own
bizarre behavior and pressure for more children, as well as Yates’ increasing obsession with religious doctrine, particularly as it was pitched by
Michael Woroniecki and his wife, Rachel. As the DSM notes, “the presence of severe ruminations or delusional thoughts about the infant is
associated with a significantly increased risk of harm to the infant.” Section 5 considers in further detail how Yates wove such delusional thoughts
into a highly stressed life that seemed to spur the thoughts all the more.

5 Andrea Yates’ History of Postpartum Disorders
5.1 The Early Years of Andrea’s Marriage
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Yates’ postpartum difficulties appeared with her first pregnancy. Soon
a fter Noah’s birth in 1994, for example, Yates experienced hallucinations—a striking vision of a knife and her stabbing someone. She dismissed the image and never revealed it to anyone u
 ntil a fter her arrest,
when she told Rusty. As research shows, postpartum depressed or psychotic w
 omen often feel ashamed or embarrassed to admit to o thers their
thoughts about harming their infants.
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When Yates became pregnant a second time in 1995 (with John), she
gave up swimming and jogging and also saw less of her friends. Her lifestyle switched yet again in 1996, when Rusty was offered work on a six-
month NASA-related project in Florida—an event that prompted the
leasing of their four-bedroom suburban h
 ouse and a drive to Florida in a
38-foot trailer. That trailer would become their “home” in a recreational-
vehicle community where Yates would care for Noah and John while Rusty
worked. In Florida, Yates miscarried but then became pregnant a third time
just when Rusty had completed his job and was ready to move back to
Houston.
The return to Houston did not mean re-inhabiting their house even
though in 1997 Yates gave birth to a third child, Paul. Rusty had other
ideas. In an effort to live “light” and “easy,” the family rented a lot for their
trailer. By 1998, a fter several months of trailer living, Rusty’s “easy living”
philosophy took a new twist. He learned that a traveling evangelist, Michael
Woroniecki, whose advice had inspired Rusty in college, was selling a
motor home that Woroniecki had converted from a 1978 Greyhound bus.
Woroniecki, his wife Rachel, and their children had used the 350 square
feet of bus for home and travel for their mobile lifestyle. B
 ecause Yates and
son Noah preferred the bus to the trailer, Rusty bought it. Noah and John
slept in the luggage compartment, while Yates, Rusty, Paul, and now Luke,
who was born in 1999, slept in the cabin.
While her brood expanded, Yates also became devoted to helping her
father, who now had Alzheimer’s disease. This task was overwhelming for
her. At the same time, Yates became further isolated from everyone. When
she did choose to see p
 eople, she always visited them, never reciprocating
by inviting them to the trailer.
Rusty’s role in Yates’ increasing aloneness, oddity of lifestyle, religious
obsession, and continual state of pregnancy should not be downplayed
with respect to any facet of Yates’ behavior. And it may never be known to
what extent her pregnancies were based on a mutual decision with Rusty or
primarily a product of Rusty’s desire for a large family. A number of people,
including Yates’ m
 other and her friend Debbie Holmes, suggested Rusty was
a dominating force in the Yates f amily, including the decision to have babies.

5.2 The Start of Yates’ Breakdown
On June 16, 1999, Yates called Rusty at work, sobbing and hysterical.
He returned to find her shaking uncontrollably and biting her fingers. His
efforts to calm her to no avail, Rusty took Yates to her parents’ home that
evening. The next day, while her mother was napping and Rusty was out
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 oing errands, the full force of Yates’ troubles became unmistakably clear.
d
She attempted suicide by taking 40 pills of her m
 other’s antidepressant
medication. An unconscious Yates was rushed by ambulance to Methodist Hospital, with Rusty following behind.
Yates told the staff at Methodist Hospital that she had consumed the
pills to “sleep forever,” but afterwards she felt guilty b
 ecause she had her
“family to live for.” At the same time, her recovery was slow. According to
notes taken by a hospital psychiatrist and a social worker, Yates was evasive about the reasons for her suicide attempt and deflected questions.
Although she was still depressed, the hospital discharged her for “insurance reasons,” the explanation written on her medical chart. The psychiatrist prescribed Zoloft, an antidepressant, and Rusty took Yates back to her
parents’ home to rest.
Yates did not like taking the medication, however, and her condition
only worsened. She would stay in bed all day and self-mutilate. At one
point, she scratched four bald patches on her scalp, picked sores in her
nose, and obsessively scraped “score marks” on her legs and arms. L
 ater,
she would tell psychiatrists that during this time, she saw visions and heard
voices, telling her to get a knife. She also watched a person being stabbed,
although she would not identify the victim. At the same time, Yates refused
to feed her c hildren or nurse her baby Luke, claiming that they were “all
eating too much.” Such delusions and thoughts about her children are consistent with the criteria listed for postpartum disorders in the DSM.
It was only after Yates’ attempted suicide that her relatives discovered
the extent of her family history of mental illness: Andrea’s brother and sister
had ongoing treatment for depression, another brother was bipolar, and,
in hindsight, her father also suffered from depression. According to the
DSM, this family history of mental disorder (particularly bipolar disorder),
along with Yates’ pre-and post-pregnancy experiences with depression,
are all factors that would heighten the likelihood of postpartum psychotic
features. As the DSM explains, “once a woman has had a postpartum episode with psychotic features, the risk of recurrence with each subsequent
delivery is between 30 p
 ercent and 50 p
 ercent.”
At different times, Yates also experienced bizarre delusions and hallucinations. She believed that t here w
 ere video cameras in the ceilings watching her in various rooms in the h
 ouse and that telev ision characters were
communicating with her. She told Rusty of t hese hallucinations; however,
neither of them informed her doctors, even though she was continually
asked whether she had hallucinations.
Of all of her family members, Yates seemed to suffer the most and her
condition continued to deteriorate. The day before she had an appointment
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with one of her psychiatrists, Eileen Starbranch, Rusty found Yates in the
bathroom looking at the mirror with a knife at her throat. Rusty had to
grab the knife away. When Rusty told Starbranch of the incident, she
insisted that Yates be hospitalized again, this time at Memorial Spring
Shadows Glen, a private facility in Houston.
The initial results of this hospitalization were disastrous. Yates was virtually catatonic for ten days. According to clinicians, catatonia is an objective sign of m
 ental disorder w
 hether or not an individual reveals what he
or she is thinking. It was also only during Yates’ stay at Memorial Spring
Shadows Glen that there would ever be any record suggesting that she
experienced hallucinations. This record was based on a doctor’s report and
observations by the doctor’s assistant.
Starbranch gave Yates a multi-drug injection that immediately improved
her behavior, according to Rusty. After a sound sleep, she seemed much
more like the person he had first met and they had in the evening what he
thought was one of their best conversations. Only l ater did Yates assert that
she considered the injection a “truth serum” that led her to lose self-control
in a way she abhorred. Her view of the injection as a “truth serum” could
be considered yet one more bizarre delusion on her part.
When Yates returned to her family after treatment, “home” was neither
her parents’ h
 ouse (which was too small) nor the bus, which her parents
considered unhealthy for her and the children. With her parents’ urging,
Rusty, a well-salaried ($80,000 a year) project manager at NASA, bought
a three-bedroom, two-bath house in a tree-lined, residential neighborhood. The house even had a place to park the bus, which was still very
important to Rusty. In the more serene surroundings, Andrea apparently
prospered—swimming laps at dawn, baking and sewing, playing with
her c hildren, and fostering an environment for home schooling, which
Rusty encouraged despite the past stress on his wife. At this point, Yates
admitted to Rusty that she had “failed” at their life in the bus; this new
phase in their life was a chance to succeed.
During this period, the family was engaging in three nights per week
of Bible study in the living room b
 ecause Rusty did not like any of the
churches in their area. Again, the views of the bus-selling traveling minister Michael Woroniecki would come to have a profound effect on the lives
of the Yates family. Through Woroniecki, Rusty came to doubt organized
religion, even though Rusty was not in complete agreement with Woroniecki’s
views. Yates was another story, however. Woroniecki’s “repent-or-burn
zeal” captivated her and she corresponded with Woroniecki and his wife
for years after she and Rusty bought their bus. Indeed, at times, the Yates
family seemed to imitate the Woronieckis—a bus-living, home-schooling,
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Bible-
reading brood relishing the isolation of itinerancy. According to
Woroniecki, “the role of woman is derived . . . from the sin of Eve.” Likewise, he thought that “bad mothers” create “bad children.” T
 here came a
time when Woroniecki’s “hell burning” influence on Yates was so g reat, it
distressed both her parents and even Rusty.
By the spring of 2000, Yates became pregnant again, a decision seemingly made with Rusty when Yates started to improve so markedly. Yet,
the news greatly alarmed Starbranch, who had warned that Yates’ prob
lems could be far more serious if they returned, as well as Yates’ mother,
who had believed all along that Rusty’s demands prompted her d
 aughter’s
breakdown. Debbie Holmes, a former nursing colleague of Yates, echoed
this view of Rusty, claiming that Yates continually depicted Rusty as manipulative and controlling and that Rusty pushed her to have the fifth baby.

5.3 Yates’ Plunge into Mental Illness
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Starbranch’s predictions rang true. Yates’ pregnancy was met by another
downward dive into mental illness, this time precipitated by the death of
Yates’ father. Yates also became more absorbed with the teachings of the
Bible. The effects of the traumatic circumstances surrounding her father’s
death were obvious: Andrea stopped talking; she would continually hold
Mary but not feed her; she would not drink liquids; she scratched and
picked at her scalp until she started to become bald again.
On March 31, 2001, four months a fter Mary’s birth, Rusty sought to
rehospitalize Yates, with Starbranch’s urging. This time, Rusty took his wife
to the Devereux Texas Treatment Center Network, a trip that Yates adamantly resisted. Only with much prodding from Rusty and her b
 rother
did she finally agree to go to the hospital. Once there, she refused to sign
forms admitting herself. B
 ecause he thought Yates’ condition was dangerous, her attending psychiatrist, Mohammed Saeed, initiated the process
of requesting that a state judge confine Yates to Austin State Hospital. Only
after Rusty’s continual pleading did she fin ally agree to sign the forms
admitting herself to Devereux.
Saeed’s account of Yates’ condition appeared to be based entirely on
Rusty’s description rather than from Yates’ treating psychiatrists or from
Yates herself who, Saeed said, rarely spoke. When Rusty insisted that
Saeed put Yates on Haldol, a drug that had been helpful to her in the
past, Saeed complied. Saeed discontinued the treatment shortly thereafter
because, he said, her “flat face” seemed to be a side effect. L ater, Saeed
would testify that, based on the little Yates said, she did not seem psychotic,
never described the torment she was going through, and denied experiencing hallucinations and delusions.
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After ten days at Devereux, Yates finally started feeding herself again—a
behavioral improvement which, in Saeed’s opinion, justified discharging
her even though her medication regime was still not stable. Also, Yates
wanted to go home and Saeed thought that Rusty could take care of her.
When Yates returned home, Rusty’s mother, Dora, visited from Tennessee to help out during the day while she stayed at a motel in the evenings.
Yet, there w
 ere clear signals of Yates’ desperate m
 ental state. On May 3, for
example, after Yates and her mother-in-law returned from taking the
children for a walk, Noah told his grandmother that he saw his mother filling up the bathtub with water. When Dora turned the water off and asked
Yates why she was r unning the water, Yates replied only, “Just in case I need
it.” Presumably, Yates’ behavior must have been quite unusual for such an
(otherwise) innocuous event to have garnered so much notice from Noah
and Dora. Yates also would not allow her friend Debbie Holmes inside the
house when Debbie stopped by to leave food that afternoon. L ater, Holmes
stated that she thought Yates had been re-possessed by the Devil, an issue
that both she and Yates had discussed a fter Yates’ illness in 1999. This time,
however, Debbie thought the “the demons had returned a hundredfold.”
Based upon what was happening, Yates returned to Devereux for rehospitalization. Again, Saeed was her chief caretaker. During her entire stay
at Devereux, Yates was almost completely s ilent and lethargic, particularly
around Rusty. Apparently, in group sessions, Rusty dominated discussions
and always answered questions asked of Yates, who would not even nod
her head. While on a combination of Haldol and antidepressants, Yates
stayed in her room most of the time on 15-minute suicide checks. By
May 14, Saeed suggested that she could go home. Although Yates was still
depressed and basically mute (apart from responding with her name when
asked), her sleeping and eating had greatly improved and she was no longer expressing suicidal thoughts.
On June 18, a month a fter Yates’ release from Devereux and a fter six
days of outpatient therapy, Rusty and Yates met with Saeed. Yates’ mental
state was sharply declining. At that point, she was off Haldol, and Saeed
was experimenting with other drug combinations. As usual, Rusty
answered most of the questions addressed to Yates, but he expressed deep
concern. She was getting worse and was now having nightmares. Rusty
asked that Saeed reconsider applying shock therapy, a strategy Saeed
declined, saying it was for far more serious disorders. Also, Saeed did not
want to re-prescribe Haldol. Instead, he readjusted Yates’ level of antidepressants, suggested that she see a psychologist, rather than a psychiatrist,
and, perhaps most strikingly, “think positive thoughts.”
The next afternoon, Yates watched cartoons on telev ision and then
joined Rusty and Noah for a quick round of basketball in the garage. Yet,
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moments later, she returned inside and went to bed without changing her
clothes. She slept until the next morning, June 20, but had a nightmare
during the night. She would not tell Rusty what the nightmare was about.
That morning, while Yates set out cereal bowls and milk for breakfast,
Rusty made sure that she had swallowed her dose of antidepressants before
he left for work. According to Rusty, his last picture prior to the killings
was one of seeing Andrea eating cereal from a box.

5.4 Yates’ Killings and the Aftermath
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From all accounts, Yates started the drownings nearly as soon as Rusty
left because her children were still having breakfast. First, she selected
“Perfect Paul,” then three years old, apparently her greatest joy (and the
“least trouble”) of the five. Paul’s death took only seconds. She tucked his
body in her bed and laid his head on the pillow. Next came Luke (age two),
John (age five), and then Mary (age six months), who was nursing a b
 ottle
while Andrea was drowning the o thers. Yates left Mary in the tub.
Seven-year-old Noah was still eating his cereal when Andrea asked him
to the bathroom. When he “saw his sister facedown in the water, he asked,
‘What happened to Mary?’ ” Noah then tried to run away. But Yates ran
after him, dragging him back to the tub—struggling to drown him while
he came up twice for air. Afterwards, Yates put Mary in the bed with her
brothers, ensuring that their arms were wrapped around their little s ister.
She left Noah in the tub.
Yates immediately dialed 9-1-1. While speaking “unemotionally” and
hesitating in response to questions, Yates finally requested police and an
ambulance. When the dispatcher asked Yates if she was ill, she said that
she was. When he asked her if she was “sure” she was alone, Yates responded
that her sister was with her when, in fact, she was alone. A
 fter Yates called
9-1-1, she called Rusty. “It’s time. I finally did it,” was her first statement to
him. Then she told him to come home and hung up. Rusty called back,
alarmed by her tone of voice, and asked Yates if anyone was hurt. “It’s the
kids,” Andrea said. He inquired which one. She said, “All of them.”
The police officers who arrived described Yates as “composed.” She
showed them where they could get clean glasses for a drink of water in
the kitchen, for example, and keys to unlock the back door.
But it was Yates’ 17-minute confession to Houston Police Sargent Eric
Mehl that was to have one of the biggest impacts on the jury. During the
jury’s brief 40 minutes of deliberation, they had requested the audiotape
of Yates’ account of what had transpired when she killed her c hildren. To
the jurors, it appeared as though Yates’ “plan” to kill her children was cold
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and methodical. Nearly all of her answers to questions were monosyllabic
and the way that Mehl questioned her fostered the impression of matter-
of-fact indifference to the killing. “No,” she did not hate her children. “No,”
she was not mad at them. She had, however, considered the prospect of
killing them for two years. She realized that she was not being a good
mother to them and “they weren’t developing correctly,” either in their
learning or their behavior. She also “realized that it was time to be punished” and, in response to Mehl’s question, she wanted the criminal justice system to punish her. She added that she had thought of drowning
the children two months earlier—and filled the tub with w
 ater—but she
“just didn’t do it at that time” and also believed that Rusty would have
stopped her.
To those who did not “know” Andrea Yates, her attitude would, no
doubt, appear indifferent and her behavior calculated. But, as two postpartum specialists have noted with respect to the Yates case, organic psychosis involves a “waxing and waning” of sensation and mood. Simply
because Yates called her husband and the police after the killings does not
necessarily mean she was experiencing a “normal mental status” and could
tell the difference between right and wrong at the time of the killings. That
kind of analysis suggests that “we extrapolate backward then “predict’ that
she had an intact thought process.” Another expert honed the key issue:
Crimes based on “deluded moral reasoning” can be “well planned, carefully executed, and . . . have evidenced high degrees of behavioral control.”
As section 6 discusses, Dietz’s perspective on Yates’ m
 ental state was
entirely different.

6 Park Dietz’s Interview and Testimony in the Andrea Yates Case
Park Dietz’s interview with Andrea Yates and his trial testimony provide additional evidence for assessing how Dietz appeared to influence
jurors. Section 6 explores one particularly striking feature of Dietz’s testimony: Even though both sides agreed that Yates severely suffered from
postpartum depression and psychosis and that it significantly affected her
conduct, neither side seriously questioned Dietz’s statements or his
knowledge.

6.1 Dietz’s Interview with Yates
Dietz interviewed Yates for two days in November 2001, nearly five
months a fter the killings and four months after Phillip Resnick, the defense’s
primary psychiatric expert, interviewed her. Over the months after the
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killings, Yates showed substantial progress due to a regimen of antipsychotic medication. Other professionals estimated that by August, her psychosis seemed u
 nder control and by September, a jury found her competent
to stand trial.
According to Dietz, Yates was grossly psychotic the day after the killings and was suffering from schizophrenia when he met her in November 2001. He still believed, however, that she knew the difference between
right and wrong at the time she killed her c hildren. This conclusion, of
course, stemmed in part from the November interview he conducted with
her and the questions he asked about how and why she planned to kill
her children.
In response to Dietz’s questions, Yates explained that she did not want
her children “tormented by Satan” as she was. She noted that Satan had
been conveying “bad thoughts” through the telev ision and the cameras in
her home. She was also “afraid Satan would lure [her] c hildren to himself—
and maybe that [she] had some Satan in [her].” She believed Satan was
“inside [her] giving [her] directions . . . about harming the c hildren . . . 
about a way out—to drown them.” According to Yates, the drowning would
be “a way out” because the children “would go up to heaven and be with
God, be safe.” Basically, “at the time” Andrea thought “this was a good idea”
because she “didn’t want [her c hildren] ruined—[she] was afraid they
would continue to go downhill—and [she] thought [she] should save them
before that happened.” Yates believed “the children w
 ere in torment” from
Satan b
 ecause they w
 ere exhibiting relatively “more strife and disobedience”; however, she did not think that Dora, her mother-in-law, was in such
torment nor Rusty, whom she believed was a “good man.” In Yates’ mind,
Satan had selected her children because of Yates’ own personal “weaknesses”; in fact, she had stopped reading the Bible close to the time of the
killings b
 ecause she “felt like Satan was nearby.”
Yates seemed to have been markedly influenced by the 1995 movie
Seven, a crime thriller about two homicide detectives who strive to solve a
series of mysterious murders patterned on the seven deadly sins: gluttony,
greed, sloth, pride, lust, envy, and wrath. Yates told Dietz that b
 ecause
“[she] felt [she] had done all the other sins” but murder, she believed that
the drowning would constitute her seventh, and last, sin. She claimed that
she was thinking of the movie on the day she killed her c hildren—“about
what [she] was about to do, and how it fit in there—the deadly sins—and
how [she had] done all of them after [she] drowned the children.” She “saw
[the drowning] as a sin that [she was] going to commit.” Although the act
of drowning would “condemn” her, it would save the children.
While Yates had ruminated about the seven deadly sins a week before
she killed her c hildren, she picked the specific date she was g oing to drown
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them only the night before. She did not tell Rusty her thoughts about the
deadly sins or of her plans to kill because, in response to Dietz’s question,
she believed Rusty would interfere. As Yates explained, if she had been
stopped, “the c hildren would still be alive” and she “would still worry about
their soul with Satan around.” On the morning of the killings, she tried to
act as normally as possible so Rusty would not be alarmed.
Despite Yates’ claims of careful planning, however, on the day of the
killings, she did not close the blinds or the curtains or take the phone off
the hook (the door had already been locked the night before and Rusty
left through the garage exit). She also remembers taking her medication.
In answer to Dietz’s questions, she said she felt “the presence of Satan that
morning . . . just helping [her] fill up the tub, and getting ready.” Yet, she
believed she would be punished (“jail”) and she knew the act was illegal.
It seemed as though Yates viewed the killing as a balancing test: “Doing it,
[the children would] go to heaven; not d
 oing it, there’s the risk of Satan
messing them up. . . . Probably if I did it, I’d get in trouble.”
Notably, in his court testimony, Dietz conceded that he did not interview e ither Rusty or Dora, both of whom refused to see him. Dietz also
stated that Yates had difficulty being viewed by others as mentally ill and
that her attitude hindered her recovery. For example, a fter her first suicide
attempt, Yates refused to take the antipsychotic medication prescribed to
her and flushed it down the toilet. As Dietz emphasized, “the most consistent story she’s indicated is that she d
 idn’t think she was psychotic, d
 idn’t
want to be thought of that way and resented someone calling her that.”
However, a key issue that was not brought out in Dietz’s testimony, e ither
in direct or cross, is that Yates, like many psychotic p
 eople, was wrong
about her mental status.

6.2 Dietz’s Empirically Unsupported Conclusions
Dietz’s testimony about Yates’ condition is full of troubling speculations
that sound authoritative but have no empirical support. Of course, the field
of psychiatry in general is vulnerable to such criticisms. As the following
analysis suggests, however, in a number of instances, Dietz’s accounts give
Yates’ actions a degree of intentionality and manipulation that seem to
derive only from Dietz’s interpretations and no other source.
6.2.1 Yates’ Suicide Attempts
Dietz testified that when Yates attempted suicide the first time using
pills, she got a “week away from the stressors, only with an overdose,” when
she was hospitalized (her admission to Methodist Hospital’s psychiatric
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unit). In other words, the idea conveyed was that with “only” an overdose,
Yates could get a substantial break from taking care of the kids and the
house. After her week-long stay at Methodist, however, Yates came back
to the same stressful environment in the cramped bus. For that reason,
according to Dietz, the second time she attempted to commit suicide, she
“upped the ante” by using a knife. Presumably, by employing a more certain and serious instrument of death, Yates could acquire even more help
and a bigger break than she got the first time by “only” ingesting pills. Dietz
indicated that Yates was successful with this approach. While she was hospitalized the second time, her parents insisted to Rusty that Yates could
no longer stay in the bus because it was not healthy for her or the children.
As a result, Rusty purchased a nice new h
 ouse, which was all ready for
her to live in when she returned from the hospital. In Dietz’s eyes, a new
home was the reward that Yates was seeking: “This time, [the suicide
attempt] not only got her hospitalized, it got her a h
 ouse.”
The implication, of course, is that Yates somehow realized that she would
get both a long break and material benefit—“a house”—for her more dramatic second suicide attempt. But, that view contradicts everything we
know of Yates: that she hated to be hospitalized, that she continually
resisted psychiatric help, that she resented any kind of psychiatric label.
Indeed, Yates was so opposed to being re-hospitalized at Devereux Texas
Treatment Center on March 31, 2001, that Saeed had to start the process
of involuntarily committing her to a state hospital. For Dietz to suggest,
even indirectly, that Yates’ suicide attempts w
 ere strategic efforts to gain a
better home derides the reality of her psychosis and the severity of her postpartum disorders. As the defense noted, Yates “never told any doctor that,
‘I wanted a new h
 ouse.’ ” Her marital history suggests just the reverse—
that Yates was enamored (perhaps even more than Rusty) with the
Woronieckis’ bus-living existence and later apologized to Rusty for not
being able to h
 andle it.
It is also questionable, even by Dietz’s own account, w
 hether Yates was
in fact “upping the ante” by using a knife rather than pills. Only moments
before making that statement, Dietz claimed that it was unclear what level
of severity Yates’ knife-using episode entailed (“varying degrees of intent”);
in contrast, her ingestion of pills would most likely have resulted in her
death if her m
 other had not awakened her. Most important, as Dietz conceded on cross-examination, Yates’ overdose and knife threat could be
“interpreted by medical experts as an alternative to hurting her c hildren.”
Psychological research suggests that “aggression against o thers and aggression against self frequently co-occur” and that “risk assessment for suicide and homicide should go hand in hand.” Yates’ psychiatric history and
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her final act of killing her children support, rather than contradict, this
suicide-homicide relationship.
6.2.2 Yates’ Pregnancies
Dietz also portrayed Yates as manipulative and controlling in her decision to discontinue medication and become pregnant again with Mary, her
fifth child. Initially, Dietz emphasized that Yates did not want to admit her
mental illness and therefore did not take her medication for that reason;
yet, he depicted her motives very differently when he discussed the medi
cation issue in the context of Yates and Rusty’s apparent efforts to have
another child. According to Dietz, her pregnancy was “one of the repeated
examples of Mrs. Yates not following the advice of her doctor and thinking she knows best and maintaining control.” Dietz suggests that Yates
directed the entire decision to conceive: “She’s the one deciding what to
do. She w ill not take the medicine u
 nless she wants it. She w
 ill get pregnant when she wants to. She’s not taking the medicine during pregnancy.”
Dietz’s analysis assumes realities of Yates’ life that did not exist. First,
all accounts of Yates’ marriage indicate that Rusty was the one in control,
the one making decisions, and the one pushing for more children. Second, testimony revealed that both Yates and Rusty had been advised by
multiple staff members “on the importance of staying on medications and
on the importance of not having another pregnancy.” Dietz’s conclusions
suggest that Rusty had nothing to do with the decision. Indeed, Rusty continually joked (even at his children’s funeral) that he always wanted
enough boys “to make up a basketball team.” Likewise, Debbie Holmes testified that Yates complained to her about the continual pregnancies.
Third, noncompliance with taking medication is the norm among psychiatric patients for a variety of reasons, but often b
 ecause the mentally ill
are paranoid or delusional about what doctors give them. By his comments,
Dietz implied that Yates’ behavior was anomalous and that her refusal of
medication related to her need to “control.” Yet, recent research suggests
that “more serious m
 ental illness is a cause not a consequence, of [a patient’s]
refusal of treatment” with antipsychotic medication. In fact, when Yates was
being evaluated for her competency hearing, she expressed concern that
her medication may be contributing to her psychotic episodes. Resisting
medication was also a m atter of pride. Fourth, many women reject medi
cation while they are pregnant; the DSM entry on postpartum disorders
discusses this very issue and makes recommendations to medical personnel about how to counteract it. Finally, Dietz never acknowledged that more
than 50 percent of all pregnancies are unplanned, irrespective of what
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c ouples want or the decisions they make. Throughout his testimony about
Yates’ last pregnancy, Dietz attributes a level of intentionality to events
that may well have simply been an accident.
6.2.3 Yates’ Knowledge of Right and Wrong
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In an interview with Time Magazine on the day that Yates was sentenced,
Dietz stated that despite Yates’ mental illness, her “thought process” still
permitted her to know right from wrong. “Her mind recognized murder
as wrong or she would not have sought the death penalty to get rid of her
inner demons and protect her children from falling into [Satan’s] grasp.”
Also, “by wanting to dispose of Satan, she had to believe Satan had evil
ideas. Therefore, she still comprehended evil to be wrong. She also “knew
that society and God would condemn her actions.’ ” Of course, Dietz’s
analysis of Yates, both in this interview and in court, presumes that Satan
actually exists.
Frequently during his testimony, Dietz would strain the interpretation
of an incident to support the view that Yates knew the difference between
right and wrong. For example, on May 3, when Yates filled the home bathtub with water while Dora Yates was present, the incident was perceived
to be so bizarre, it sent Yates back to Devereux. According to Dietz, Yates
“doesn’t give a reasonable account of why she did that [fill the tub], and
they [Devereux] take her back the next day or the day a fter.” But, in the
months following the incident, Andrea gave several accounts of why she
filled the tub that day, including what seemed to be the most reasonable
(and defense-oriented) one—she had thoughts of drowning her c hildren.
A portion of the direct examination of Dietz seemed to recognize that this
explanation could support the defense’s position. If Yates were contemplating drowning her c hildren with Dora present, it would fuel the defense’s
argument that she may not have known that what she was doing was
wrong. While this interpretation of Yates’ motives is purely speculative, it
is the most rational account that Yates herself provides. It is also congruent with the vague statement that Yates made in response to Dora’s question of why she was r unning the w
 ater, that is, “Just in case I need it.”
Indeed, at a later point in his testimony, Dietz downplayed the fact that
Yates told others that she was considering drowning her children while
Dora was present. Dietz’s story is intertwined with Yates’ own conflicting
accounts. As Dietz explained, “sometimes she told doctors that she was
thinking of drowning the c hildren then. Sometimes she said she thought
she might drown the c hildren then. Sometimes she said that she might
need it [the tub water] because they might have their water cut off by the
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utility company; and at those times, she said that she w
 asn’t thinking of
drowning the children then.” However, the explanation that Yates gave
Dietz while he was interviewing her is the least reasonable one: “the utility company truck explanation rather than drowning the children.”
The more pointed question to ask is, why did Yates tell Dietz the com
pany truck answer when she told others she was thinking of drowning
her children? Does it really make sense for a woman to fill her family tub
in such an odd manner on May 3 b
 ecause of a possible w
 ater shortage but
then fill it again on June 20 to drown her children? It seems unlikely that
Yates’ disruptive actions on May 3, which w
 ere sufficiently disturbing to
hospitalize her again, appeared due to her concern over a water shortage,
particularly in light of the other evidence.
In sum, Dietz’s testimony was too focused on trying to explain Yates’
illogical thinking, which basically stemmed from her m
 ental illness. His
analysis was not based on “facts” but rather pure speculation about her
delusional thought patterns. According to one legal scholar, “medical expert
witnesses are not advocates for either side in the litigation, but may advocate their opinion.” Yet, t here w
 ere a number of aspects of Dietz’s testimony
where his prosecutorial bent came through quite obviously. For example,
despite his level of experience, Dietz repeatedly referred to the drownings
as “homicides” or “crimes,” even though at the time, Yates had not been
convicted of anything. Likewise, at certain points, it was Dietz who directly
led the prosecution to a criminal conclusion about Yates. For example: “Q.
Now, you noted that—or Dr. Saeed told Mr. Yates that someone must be
with his wife, but she was left alone; was that correct? A. Yes. And, of
course, the significance of that is that it gives her the opportunity to commit the crimes.”

6.3 Dietz’s Attempts to Give “Logic” to Yates’ Illogical Delusions
A major portion of Dietz’s testimony was analyzing Yates’ “homicide”
in three phases: (1) the pre-homicide phase, (2) the homicide phase, and
(3) the post-homicide phase. The pre-homicide phase was key for Yates’
defense b
 ecause it went to the issue of w
 hether she knew the difference
between right and wrong. Dietz conceded that Yates told both Rusty and
her friend Debbie Holmes about “her concerns for the presence of Satan,
the influence of Satan.” Even in Dietz’s opinion, Yates was open about her
fears and did not attempt to hide them.
What Dietz emphasizes, however, is that despite Yates’ openness about
Satan, she concealed the thoughts of harming her children from other
people. If, for example, she was concerned that by mentioning the harm
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to other p
 eople it would actually happen, Dietz responds that this fear
would be even more reason for Yates to talk about it. Dietz’s “legal-like”
logic applied to the thinking of a mentally ill Andrea Yates goes as follows:
If it’s true that she believed that killing the c hildren would save them, then
why would she not want it to happen. She would want to talk about it so it
came true and the c hildren would be saved. So, I concluded at that point
that she’s keeping it secret, she knows that other people are going to stop her,
that it’s wrong, that it’s a bad idea; and she admits as such. She admits that
she knows p
 eople w
 ill stop her.

Yet, t here is no factual support for anything Dietz says. Dietz also rather
bizarrely analyzes Yates’ statements as real and “debates” her theories about
Satan even though everyone agreed that Yates was mentally ill and delusional. Delusions are by definition illogical. As a key text on delusional disorders emphasizes, “in the delusional mode, thought form is relatively
normal but the abnormal content predominates and is associated with
profound, but focused illogicality.” Dietz’s story is based on applying a logical analysis to Yates’ truly illogical ruminations. T
 here is r eally no diagnostically acceptable point to it. Nor is it even clear that Yates intended
what Dietz said because she never articulated it, he did.
Perhaps anticipating this criticism, Dietz explained that he is entitled
to apply such an inordinate amount of logic to the thinking of a mentally
ill person b
 ecause Yates seemed to him to be “psychologically ready” to
engage in the act of killing. Yet again, Dietz does not provide any empirical support for this very vague explanation. Parenthetically, the field of psychiatry does not encourage members of its profession to engage in
logic-applied analyses of the illogical ramblings of mentally ill people.
But, for Yates, there was no escape from Dietz’s testimony; he seemed
to have cut off every avenue with some explanation based entirely on speculative presumptions. Dietz showed striking confidence in his conclusions, despite the conjecture. Comparably noteworthy was Dietz’s complete
disregard of the literature on postpartum depression, which indicates that
women generally do not tell o thers that they are thinking about harming
or killing their children; they are afraid and embarrassed and disturbed
by such thoughts. Dietz’s sweeping generalizations about Yates’ m
 ental state
are consistent with his ignorance of the subject matter.

-1—
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6.4 Dietz’s Criticism of Yates’ Inability to Nurture Her Dead Children
Dietz also focused on the easiest emotional target of Yates’ illogicalities—
how she treated her c hildren a fter she killed them. For example, Dietz

White_2nd pass.indd 402

11/30/16 12:11 PM

Andrea Yates: A Continuing Story about Insanity

403

queried why Yates did not try to “comfort the c hildren, telling them they
are g oing to be with Jesus or be with God.” Again, however, such comments
were guesswork on Dietz’s part. In other words, is it typical for mentally ill
people to give their c hildren religious words of comfort before they kill
them, particularly if they think Satan is their guide?
While being cross-examined, Dietz acknowledged that Yates had been
nurturing toward her dead c hildren. She had placed her c hildren’s heads
on pillows, for example, with Mary’s head “resting on her older brother’s
shoulder” and Mary’s hand “cupped by her older brother’s hands.” According to the police officers who arrived on the scene, the c hildren’s bodies
appeared “posed,” as though the “older b
 rother w
 ere taking care of the
younger sister.” Such arrangements are perhaps a more objective gauge of
Yates’ thoughts than the speculative hindsight Dietz offered. At the very
least, the way that Yates situated her children suggested that she may have
believed they w
 ere g oing to take care of one another; in contrast, Dietz
had nothing to support his comments apart from sheer conjecture.
Similarly, Dietz noted that Yates seemed to cover each of her children’s
heads and faces as she put them on the bed. He suggested that she may
have covered them so that the remaining c hildren, who w
 ere still alive,
would not discover the bodies. L
 ater in his testimony, however, Dietz stated
that Yates’ covering of her c hildren’s faces was “an indication of her feeling
guilt or shame.” Dietz’s explanation for Yates’ behavior is perplexing; t here
is a social norm to cover the faces of the deceased for reasons of respect or
reverence. It would have been just as reasonable for Dietz to have pitched
Yates’ motives in an alternative way, in other words, to state that covering
the children was Yates’ way of showing care and comfort to them, given
that all of these explanations are speculative anyway. Nonetheless, Dietz
did resist supporting one of the prosecution’s more damning insinuations—
that Yates’ decision to leave Noah in the bathtub a fter he died was cold
hearted. Instead, Dietz noted that, at 50 pounds, Noah was too heavy for
Yates to lift. “Nurses know not to lift heavy weights.”
Lastly, Dietz explained that Yates seemed “grossly psychotic” and mentally disturbed from June 21 to some period thereafter, so “very sick” that
she was hearing “growls and voices” and seeing “teddy bears and ducks
and marching soldiers” that she believed were satanic. Yet, he claimed there
was not “nearly as much evidence of that kind of extreme sickness or gross
psychosis on June 20th as [there is] for the period beginning June 21st.”
Dietz attributed his impression that Yates was “different in a sicker way”
to the rapid changes in her life after she was arrested. However, there is an
alternative explanation. Yates did not receive nearly as much medical attention on June 20 as she did on June 21, when she became the object of
intense evaluation. On June 20, she was with police for much of the day
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whereas on June 21, she was surrounded by psychiatrists who w
 ere able
to assess her m
 ental state. Given these day-to-day differences in the amount
of time Yates spent with medically trained professionals, Dietz’s conclusions are unwarranted.
This analysis of Dietz’s testimony could extend even further, continually assessing e very word in the way that Dietz evaluated Yates’ e very move.
However, this chapter is not intended to be an indictment of Dietz per se.
Rather, it is a commentary on how swayed and fragile insanity determinations can be in the heat of litigation and how inadequate the criminal justice system is to h
 andle them. Dietz did not create this situation; he merely
responds to the many who want him to be part of it. As the following discussion makes clear, other aspects of the Yates trial as well as the law and
culture of Harris County also appeared to be critical contributors to Yates’
conviction.

7 Other Viewpoints on the Andrea Yates Case
Up to this point, discussion of the Yates trial has focused on Park Dietz.
Of course, there were other perspectives and experts involved in the case.
Section 7 examines briefly only a selected number of these additional
people and issues to give a glimpse of a broader story about Andrea.

7.1 The Overall Defense and Prosecution Perspective
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In general, the defense contended that Yates’ m
 ental illness led her to
believe she made the right choice when she killed her c hildren. Her long
history of illness and her many visits to doctors created a situation in which
a number of defense experts w
 ere called to testify about her condition at
the time they treated her or her mental state at the time she killed her
children. Yet, b
 ecause of the numbers of medical specialists involved in
the case who had evaluated Yates at different times and for different purposes, some offered seemingly conflicting narratives of her perception of
right and wrong. This range of opinion for the defense contrasted with the
prosecution’s more consistent argument that Yates’ acts were sane and
intentional b
 ecause the prosecution primarily relied only on Dietz’s
narrative.
Ironically, then, the severity and extent of Yates’ m
 ental illness may have
undercut her defense. T
 here was one story of sanity from the prosecution
and several stories of insanity from the defense. For example, Dr. Melissa
Ferguson, a psychiatrist at the Harris County Jail, testified that Yates told
her in a post-arrest interview that drowning her children was “the right
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t hing to do” since it saved them from a life of torment and eventual damnation in hell. Defense expert Dr. Phillip Resnick testified that although
Yates knew her actions were illegal, “she did what she thought was right
in the world she perceived through her psychotic eyes at the time.” Describing Yates’ motives as “altruistic,” Resnick explained that she believed that
she was sending her c hildren to heaven and, in setting herself up for execution, ridding the world of Satan. Another expert witness for the defense,
Dr. George Ringholz, explained that in the midst of her “acute psychotic
episode,” Yates “did not know the actions she took on that day w
 ere wrong.”
Dr. Steve Rosenblatt further elaborated: “She was out of contact with real
ity, did not know right from wrong, and in my opinion, clearly was within
what’s considered the legal definition of insanity.”
Jurors struggling to make sense of it all would be additionally taxed
by the open disagreement between Resnick and another defense expert,
Dr. Lucy Puryear. According to Puryear, Yates was too sick to know that her
actions w
 ere wrong. In contrast, Resnick stated that Yates knew her acts
were illegal, but believed they w
 ere right because they saved her c hildren
from eternal damnation. Granted, t hese two positions are not entirely mutually exclusive; however, Puryear acknowledged during cross-examination
that t here w
 ere conflicts between her testimony and Resnick’s and stated
merely that they had “differing opinions.”
Prosecutor Joseph Owmby claimed, on the other hand, that determining insanity did not come down to “ ‘a battle of the experts,’ ” but rather
was “ ‘a question of common sense[.]’ ” According to Owmby, the experts
simply “present the evidence from the medical side” while the jurors,
though unable to diagnose m
 ental illness, “can tell you w
 hether they believe
a person knew right from wrong at the time.” Similar to Dietz’s testimony,
the prosecution downplayed Yates’ history of m
 ental illness as well as the
neurobiological underpinnings of her disorder.
Yet, most of the expert testimony offered in the Yates case did little to
abate the confusion surrounding Yates’ mental state. Not surprisingly, the
testimony of expert witnesses for the prosecution directly clashed with the
testimony of expert witnesses for the defense. As one psychiatric journalist explained, although prosecution expert Park Dietz and defense expert
Phillip Resnick are well known in their mutual fields, they nonetheless
viewed Yates’ insanity defense “in polar opposite ways.”
Overall, it appeared to be a tactical problem for the defense to deal with
so many psychiatric experts. Their contrasting analyses blunted the
defense’s theory. Which story should the jurors choose? Assuming that
Resn ick was probably one of the stronger psychiatrists in terms of his
demeanor and experience and was therefore more equal to Dietz, the
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defense may have been better off presenting just Resnick (in addition to
the psychiatrists who actually treated Yates). With this approach, the
defense would have had a clearer, more linear, story that Yates was indeed
insane. As it so happened, Dietz probably appeared better with his single
theory in contrast to the defense’s multiple theories concerning Yates’
mental state.
The defense also would have benefited from questioning Dietz more
aggressively about the facts of Yates’ history of postpartum depression and
psychosis. Such a “detailing to death” tactic could have accomplished two
goals: (1) it would have accentuated Dietz’s lack of expertise in the area,
and (2) it would have stressed the neurological and biological aspects of
the disorders. The jury would perhaps more fully appreciate that insanity
determinations are based on far more than just “common sense” or speculation. The jurors’ own comments indicate that this kind of psychiatric
evidence had little to no impact in their forty minutes of deliberation before
deciding to convict Yates.

7.2 The Jurors’ Comments
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The jurors’ explanations for their verdict suggest that they w
 ere heavily
swayed by the prosecution’s presentation of the case. In their view, Yates’
manner of killing her c hildren seemed “premeditated and methodical.”
They cited her videotaped confession and the photographs of her children,
alive and dead, as “the most compelling evidence” of their unequivocal
belief that Yates knew right from wrong. According to one juror, for example, b
 ecause Yates called the police immediately after the killings and
could converse with them and account for her behavior, “it seemed as if
she was thinking pretty clearly.” Another juror emphasized that Yates “was
able to describe what she did. . . . I felt like she knew exactly what she was
doing.” These “objective” actions of Yates’ are the kinds of factual evidence
that Dietz stressed in his determination that she was sane.
The jurors also appeared to take seriously the prosecution’s depiction
of Yates’ religiosity and her perception of her conduct as sinful. Indeed,
religion was an important force throughout the trial in a number of differ
ent ways. For example, prosecutor Owmby claimed to have prayed before
deciding to seek the death penalty for Yates, and he expressed his firm
belief that she was aware that she had sinned. He also elicited testimony
from one of the defense’s expert witnesses admitting that Yates knew she
had sinned. Surely, her own statements supported that view.
On the surface at least, the jury seemed predisposed to embrace such
religious characterizations. In a telev ision interview with four of the jurors
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conducted shortly after the Yates verdict, the jurors’ comments indicated
that they all shared some Christian convictions. As the interviewer emphasized, “in a case [the Yates jurors] found emotionally draining, they say
prayer got them through.” According to one juror, for example, all the jurors
“held hands and prayed . . . [the] Lord’s prayer, most mornings” and they
“did the same thing before and after the verdict.” Another juror affirmed
the prosecution’s sentiment that Yates “knew it was wrong in the eyes of
God.” During the trial, there appeared to be little left for the defense to
hold on to other than evidence of Yates’ mental illness, and the nature and
severity of her illness did not come across adequately.
Dietz also accentuated sin and religion generally throughout his testimony, far more than the “facts” of Yates’ mental history. Of course, on the
surface, Yates’ explanations for why she killed w
 ere laced with religion.
Yet, given the severity of her m
 ental illness, the religious aspects of her
delusions were symptoms of her disorder, not a substantive issue for Dietz
to “debate” with her. Delusions and hallucinations about the devil are not
uncommon among w
 omen with postpartum psychosis and t hose who end
up killing their c hildren. In turn, all mental illnesses are contextually
based, reflecting the culture and day-to-day circumstances of the mentally
ill person. In other words, mental disability is interlinked with other influences in a person’s life, including the community where that person lives.

7.3 Religion and Culture
Given the Yates f amily’s intense interest in the Bible and the Woronieckis’
lifestyle, it is understandable that such themes would provide the foundation for Yates’ delusional thoughts. While the Yates family was not affiliated with any church, Rusty decided to hold the children’s funeral close to
their home at the Clear Lake Church of Christ, which Rusty now regularly attends. Over a two-century history, Churches of Christ have divided
into eight primary branches, now totaling nearly two million members
worldwide. The majority mainstream wing of the Churches of Christ is
especially strong in the region of the United States spanning from M
 iddle
Tennessee to West Texas. The tenets of this mainstream branch give some
perspective on Rusty’s current religious views and what he may have
believed in the past.
Consistent with Rusty’s prior distance from organized religion, Churches
of Christ purport to be nondenominational and therefore are not Catholic
or Protestant. Rather, followers of the Church simply call themselves
“Christians.” Commonly, members contend “that they have restored the
primitive church of the apostolic age and are therefore nothing more or
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less than the true, original church described in the New Testament.”
Indeed, Churches of Christ have essentially “denied that they had a defining history other than the Bible itself” and many members have no knowledge of the Church’s original founders. “Biblical authority,” therefore, is
paramount and Church members defy “hierarchy or headquarters or
national program.” As a result, each congregation is an independent body
and “practices vary widely” among them.
The Clear Lake Church of Christ has an extensive website, which offers
a range of lessons. The Church also sponsors the White Stone Ministry,
whose mission is in part to aid “those who do not know Christ” by introducing them to Jesus and the Bible’s scriptures. In addition to posting specific scriptures, the White Stone Ministry offers a number of instructive
articles, which appear to focus on “sexual sin” and the hazards of pornography, particularly in comparison to a good marriage.
The importance of religion in the south and Harris County in particular
should not be downplayed when analyzing the reasons for Yates’ conviction, especially b
 ecause religious themes w
 ere highlighted by the prosecution. According to one legal scholar’s analysis of the literature on “the
southern subculture of punitiveness,” a key “facet of American Southern
exceptionalism is the South’s distinctive embrace of Protestant fundamentalism,” which is why the South is commonly referred to as “the Bible b
 elt.”
In turn, a substantial body of research shows a link between Southern
fundamentalism and support of the death penalty. While the precise explanation for this association is not clear, it is “real” nonetheless and exists
along with other evidence of the South’s disproportionate proclivity to
violence.
With respect to the Yates case specifically, it seems that the prosecution and Dietz w
 ere in religious sync with the jury, presuming the jurors
were in any way representative of Harris County, the heart of the Bible belt.
While the role of the jury is to reflect community values, Dietz’s “Bible
thumping” may have merely reinforced what could have been the jury’s
own initial, moral, thesis about Yates’ mental state. The defense should have
detailed Dietz to death to separate the religion from the “real” facts of the
case. As it stands, religion appeared to dominate much of the testimony,
and the medical aspects of postpartum psychosis and Yates’ history of
mental illness took a substantially smaller role.

7.4 Andrea Yates’ Competency
-1—
0—
+1—

One of the most significant problems that the defense confronted was
Yates’ resistance to assisting in her own case. From the moment she completed the killings, she seemed intent upon seeking punishment for her
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actions. This kind of thinking may have been a symptom of her particular
mental illness—her suicidal and homicidal ideas—and it is not unusual.
In an interview with the police who responded to her call immediately
after the killings, for example, the only question Yates asked was when she
would be tried. The next day, she told her prison psychiatrist, Melissa Ferguson, that she was guilty and deserved punishment. Dr. Gerald Harris,
the clinical psychologist who testified for the defense at Yates’ competency
hearing, recalled that when he first spoke to Yates shortly after the killings, she made troubling comments regarding Satan. In arguing that Yates
was not yet competent to stand trial, Harris emphasized that p
 eople are
not going to adequately defend themselves if they believe that their death
w ill eliminate Satan.
In his competency report, Harris also noted that even though Yates was
experiencing both auditory and visual hallucinations, she claimed that she
was “fine and has no mental problems.” In turn, Yates “admitted only that
she was depressed in the past and had some irrational thoughts”; yet, she
“appeared to believe” that her medication “helped the depression” but may
also “have caused the psychotic symptoms.” Likewise, she “repeatedly
expressed an aversion to taking any medication because of her “pride.’ ”
Harris found Yates incompetent to stand trial, given that “her denial of
mental illness and reluctance to provide information about it prevents
access to information that could be important to her defense.” He further
observed that “she is easily confused and manipulated and has a diminished emotional capacity, likely preventing her from presenting herself
appropriately in court.”
Dr. Steven Rubenzer, the state’s forensic psychologist, found Yates competent to stand trial despite the fact that she denied her m
 ental illness and
downplayed her depression. When Rubenzer asked her about her use of
the insanity defense, Yates “stated she does not believe she is mentally ill
and should be punished for her actions.” This response supported her attorneys’ claim that “she has consistently expressed the desire to plead guilty”
and “has expressed reluctance to use an insanity plea.” In addition, Rubenzer reported that Yates evidenced feelings of “depression, social isolation,
suspiciousness of other people” as well as a “feeling that her thoughts are
blocked, or taken away, or can be heard by other people.” Yates also stated
that “she has heard voices that others cannot hear in the past.” However,
while Rubenzer acknowledged that Yates’ desire for punishment could hinder her ability to assist in her own defense, this f actor did not preclude his
determination that she was competent to stand trial.
The transient nature of Yates’ postpartum psychosis contributed to the
defense’s hurdles because she was being treated and her mental state therefore improved. Ferguson observed that Yates continued to show signs of
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psychosis for a full month after the drownings, but by early August the
psychosis had lifted. Legally, the fact that Yates no longer suffered from
psychosis at the time of trial should not have posed a problem. The Texas
insanity statute clearly states that defendants need only have lacked knowledge as to the wrongfulness of their actions “at the time of the conduct
charged.” Nonetheless, jurors may have been skeptical of a mental illness
that allegedly existed during the commission of the crime, but seemed to
have disappeared by the time of trial.
The defense introduced psychiatric testimony and a vast array of medical records to establish Yates’ history of mental illness and post-arrest
psychosis. But the only person who could genuinely testify to her state of
mind at the essential moment, the moment of the killings, was Yates herself. In an interview with Rubenzer, Yates claimed that she thought her
actions were right during the time she drowned her children, and only
“realized they were legally wrong after the fact when she called the police.”
Given that her knowledge of right and wrong was at the crux of her entire
case, it would have been helpful if Yates had elaborated upon this statement for the jury’s benefit. Rubenzer testified that as Yates’ m
 ental health
improved, she would become better able to appreciate her actions; one can
only wonder whether part of her reluctance to assist in her own defense
was due to her growing guilt and horror at the enormity of what she had
done.

7.5 Final Comments
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The Yates case concerned a multitude of legal and social issues; this
chapter focused on just a few. T
 here is no in-depth discussion, for example, of potential solutions for the problems that the case revealed although,
of course, improvements are clearly needed. While it is beyond the bounds
of this chapter to consider this topic in any more detail, a few points merit
brief mention.
A critical point pertains to the narrow nature of the Texas insanity standard. According to Dietz, Yates most likely would not have been convicted if the insanity standard had been more lenient, such as the ALI test.
Indeed, in a postpartum depression case that followed Yates’ conviction,
Dietz successfully testified as an expert for the defense in an ALI test state
(Illinois). The mother, a pediatrician who killed one of her sons with a knife
and severely assaulted the other son, was found not guilty by reason of
insanity based largely, it seems, on Dietz’s testimony.
Most states, like Texas, follow a M’Naghten-type standard, not an ALI
test. Dietz has suggested that one possible solution to any injustice that
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the Yates case may have created is to adopt the approach applied in G
 reat
Britain. Under the British Infanticide Act of 1922, which was amended in
1938, a mother who evidences a postpartum disorder and kills her infant
during the first year of its life can only be convicted of manslaughter, and
not murder. Postpartum disorders are recognized as a form of diminished
capacity that reduces murder to manslaughter, thereby providing a trial
court some range in determining sentencing (anywhere from life imprisonment to a psychiatric sentence).
Of course, Great Britain does not have the death penalty, which was a
key element in the Yates case irrespective of the insanity defense.
Other kinds of reforms have also been suggested for incorporating postpartum disorders as evidence for a defense or mitigation. Yet, the British
Infanticide Act is an established illustration of how infanticide can be
treated as a separate category of crime when there are medical problems
associated with the killing. As it stands, American law has neither a separate criminal category nor any legislative recognition of postpartum psychosis as a mitigating f actor, although the disorder can be used as a defense
in criminal cases.
Notably, one key issue potentially on appeal in the Yates case could have
had a major impact on the outcome apart from any kind of new reform
proposal involving postpartum disorders. Under Texas law, Yates’ attorneys
were unable to explain to the jury the consequences of Yates being found
“not guilty by reason of insanity.” The state has a provision requiring that
a defendant not be automatically released from the trial court’s jurisdiction when acquitted u
 nder the insanity defense. In fact, the trial court has
the “continuing jurisdiction to impose involuntary commitment for a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity” as well as “maintain jurisdiction to
involuntarily commit an acquitted defendant to the state mental hospital
for the rest of the defendant’s natural life.” Because of the stringent nature
of the court’s control over a defendant determined to be insane, it is conceivable that the Yates jury would have been influenced by knowing that
Yates could not possibly have “walked f ree” if they had accepted her insanity plea. It also seems likely that Dietz’s expert testimony would not have
had the same effect if Texas did not have such a harsh insanity provision.
Debates abound on how psychiatric experts like Dietz should be treated
in cases involving insanity determinations. Historically, the criminal justice system encouraged experts to become involved in insanity cases
because it was believed that doctors and lawyers working together would
produce a higher form of justice for defendants. By the mid-1800s, however, conflict between the two professions was rampant and the strategy
of using experts was both expensive and commonly unproductive. As this
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chapter’s analysis of Dietz’s testimony indicates, these problems remain
today. Some legal scholars have recommended that judges appoint experts
approved by both sides to avoid the potential biases that arise because of
the experts’ partisanship. Those skeptical of the contention that any expert
can be unbiased, however, have other suggestions. For example, the criminal justice system could (1) require that the experts be hired by one party
but have their role limited or (2) mandate that the experts serve only as a
consultant to an attorney. While other kinds of reforms have been suggested, the law remains quite static in terms of any changes, despite the
obvious difficulties.
The issue of bias among experts perhaps becomes especially provocative in cases involving gender specific criminal defenses as well as gender
differences in the context of the death penalty. As legal commentators have
insightfully noted, the Yates case evokes sensitive subjects that arise when
mothers are charged for killing their children. Dietz’s testimony specifically targeted Andrea’s role as “mother” both before and after she killed
her children; it is no leap to suggest this issue was significant in her
conviction.
This overview provides some inkling of the broad range of f actors bearing on the Andrea Yates case. For this reason alone, it appears that the
case is one of the most significant and complex insanity stories in the past
few decades.

8 Conclusion
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This chapter examined the different stories behind the Andrea Yates
death penalty case—the defense’s, the prosecution’s, and the explanation
that Yates herself provided. The jury did not accept the defense’s story that
Yates was insane and thought she was u
 nder Satan’s influence at the time
she drowned her five children in the bathtub. Rather, the jury convicted
Yates and sentenced her to life in prison based on the prosecution’s story
that she was sane and acting intentionally when she killed her c hildren,
even though she was mentally ill. Yates herself fueled the prosecution’s
account and, of course, to her detriment. She felt that she had sinned and
that she deserved to die.
The most persuasive storyteller of them all, however, was Park Dietz,
the prosecution’s star expert witness. His singular, consistent narrative of
Yates’ sanity contrasted sharply with the multiple, inconsistent portrayals
provided by defense experts. Ironically, the severity of Yates’ mental illness appeared in some sense to be a negative force in her case. It constituted the underpinnings of her wish to be punished (even executed) and

White_2nd pass.indd 412

11/30/16 12:11 PM

Andrea Yates: A Continuing Story about Insanity

413

it also produced the numbers of doctors who became involved in her life
and, consequently, her trial. All of these factors contributed to a psychiatrically muddled snapshot of who Yates was.
There w
 ere other apparently key influences in Yates’ case—the punitive nature of Harris County and Yates’ death-qualified jury, for example,
as well as the atypically strict and ambiguous structure of the Texas insanity standard. The power of Dietz’s testimony, however, was the primary
focus of the discussion. Despite his reputation for emphasizing “facts” and
his ability to offer a much simpler landscape of Yates’ mental state, Dietz’s
level of speculation was troubling. There was little, if any, empirical basis
for his conclusions, and his sweeping conjecture spotlighted his lack of
expertise in postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis.
Dietz’s version of “Who is Andrea Yates?” was convincing to the jury,
although it is difficult to discern how much reality was behind it. At the
same time, legal scholars and policy makers have yet to offer substantial
improvements on the way expert testimony is treated in court. The Park
Dietzes of the expert testimony world are not simply invited to be part of
the criminal justice system, they are avidly embraced. It is not up to them
to change a system in which they are providing what is viewed to be a necessary serv ice. They should, however, comport with the ethical requirements of their profession. And legal procedures should also control what
kinds of stories can be told.
This chapter’s analysis of the Andrea Yates case makes no claim to have
the “right” story about Yates, whatever that may be. Based on the limited
amount of information yet available on the case, it had other goals. For
example, an examination of the Yates trial shows “how unsettled and unsettling narratives from life are” and how many different views of a person
can arise depending on who holds the lens. As one scholar emphasizes,
“it is not just who and what we are that we want to get straight but who
and what we might have been, given the constraints that memory and culture impose on us.” It seems that the legal system did not “get straight” the
Andrea Yates story during the trial. Maybe it w
 ill get it right when the case
is appealed.51

Notes
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